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Abstract
This study examines the impact of hospital consolidation on the financial
performance of consolidating hospitals. In doing so, this study also addresses the potential
trade-off of hospital consolidation for society between decreased competition and
improved efficiency. Based on economic theory, we hypothesize that hospital
consolidation leads to an improvement in hospital financial performance by decreasing
competition, which allows consolidating hospitals to charge higher prices, and by
increasing efficiency, which lowers the costs of providing a given level of services for
consolidating hospitals. Furthermore, we hypothesize that consolidation produces a
competition/efficiency trade-off for society, as illustrated by the Williamson Trade-Off
Model. We empirically test these hypotheses by running random effects regressions for a
financial performance, price, and average cost model. Our results indicate that financial
performance does improve for consolidating hospitals following consolidation, but there
does not appear to be a trade-off for society. In fact, we find evidence that consolidation
increases prices, but leads to an insignificant change in hospital efficiency/costs.
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I. Introduction
Over the past 25 years, extensive consolidation has occurred in the hospital
industry. According to Irving Levin Associates, consolidation in the hospital industry is
also increasing, with 77 hospital mergers occurring in 2010, 86 in 2011, and 105 in 2012
(The Hospital Acquisition Report, 2012). Recently, many hospitals have chosen to
consolidate in response to stress placed on the hospital industry by the Affordable Care
Act. In fact, many hospital executives argue that they have little choice but to consolidate
given the new regulations which will result in lower Medicare and Medicaid payments
from the government and increased pressure on hospitals to reduce costs and lower patient
utilization (Creswell & Abelson, 2013). Overall, new regulations appear to put downward
pressure on hospital financial performance.
Hospitals hope that consolidation1 will have two effects that improve their overall
financial performance and improve their long-term viability. The first potential effect is
that hospitals become more efficient through these consolidations, which can reduce the
cost of providing hospital care. The second potential effect of consolidation is that
consolidating hospitals gain market power from a reduction in competition, which can
allow these hospitals to increase their prices. Note that these effects could allow
consolidating hospitals to mitigate pressures from the Affordable Care Act.
While these two potential effects are both desirable for consolidating hospitals,
there may be a trade-off between the two effects for society as a whole. On the one hand,
society benefits from potential improvements in efficiency because resources are saved and
can be used productively elsewhere. On the other hand, the potential increase in prices
(resulting from a loss of competition) decreases consumer welfare. Thus, when hospitals
1
1. In this study, consolidation refers to mergers (i.e. two hospitals joining together under single ownership) and system
1
acquisitions (i.e. the purchase of a facility by a hospital system).

consolidate, antitrust officials must decide which effect dominates (Sprang et al., 2009). If
the improved efficiency effect dominates the decreased competition effect, then “social
surplus” should increase and anti-trust officials should allow the merger to occur.
However, if the decreased competition effect raises prices enough to dominate any
efficiency improvements, then social surplus will fall, and this may lead anti-trust officials
to prevent the merger from occurring. To make matters more complicated, anti-trust
officials must also consider whether hospitals are more viable in the long-run as a result of
consolidation. Improved long term viability could increase consumer welfare if it decreases
the number of hospital closures or allows consolidating hospitals to provide higher quality
services.
The research we conduct in this study aims to promote an increased understanding
of (1) the impact of hospital consolidation on hospital financial performance and (2) the
potential efficiency/competition trade-off of hospital consolidation for society. It is
important that policymakers properly assess the restructuring efforts that continue in the
hospital sector and our research should certainly provide a strong basis in evaluating the
costs and benefits of hospital consolidation. Moreover, we find that the existing literature
on hospital consolidation has often produced mixed results with regards to market power
and cost effects and we find that little to no research has been conducted on the direct
impact of hospital consolidation on hospital financial performance. Thus, we think our
research can certainly add to the existing literature on consolidation.
Overall, our research seeks to answer the following two questions: (1) does hospital
consolidation lead to an improvement in the financial performance of consolidating
hospitals and (2) is a competition/efficiency trade-off produced for society as a result of
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hospital consolidation? Note that in addressing this second question, we will also
determine whether there is a net social benefit or net social loss from hospital
consolidation. With regards to the first question, we hypothesize that hospital consolidation
leads to an improvement in hospital financial performance due to a decrease in
competition, which allows consolidating hospitals to charge higher prices, and due to an
increase in efficiency, which lowers the costs of providing a given level of services for
consolidating hospitals. Furthermore, in regards to the second question, we hypothesize
that there is a trade-off for society and prices will increase enough to dominate any
efficiency improvements (creating a net social loss from consolidation). We will eventually
test these hypotheses by running random effects regressions for a financial performance,
price, and average cost model.
The structure of this study is as follows. In the first section, we present a detailed
theoretical analysis of the relationship between hospital financial performance and the
independent variables that will be included in our conceptual model. These independent
variables will include our variables of interest, competition and efficiency, as well as,
relevant control variables. This section will also use the Williamson Trade-Off Model to
analyze the changes that should occur as a result of consolidation. The second section of
this study will provide an overview of the relevant literature on the topic of hospital
consolidation. The five articles that we examine in this section will allow us determine the
strength of our conceptual model and develop some ideas on how to specify our empirical
model. Finally, the third and forth sections will specify our operational models and use
random effects to estimate these operational models. Ultimately, this will provide us with
empirical results that can be used to test our hypotheses.

3

II. Theoretical Analysis

2.0 Introduction to the Theoretical Analysis
In this section, we present our conceptual variables and give a detailed theoretical
analysis of the relationship between each conceptual variable and hospital financial
performance. We start by examining the expected relationship between financial
performance and our two variables of interest, competition and efficiency. Then we move
into a discussion of the impact of consolidation on these two variables using the
Williamson Trade-Off Model. Finally, we discuss the relevant control variables and their
theoretical relationship with the financial performance of hospitals.

2.1 Competition
As previously stated, competition is one of our variables of interest because we
have hypothesized that hospital consolidation will impact the level of competition in the
market area. However, before we illustrate the impact of hospital consolidation on
competition, we need to establish the theoretical relationship between the level of
competition a hospital faces and hospital financial performance. To start, theory tells us
that firms in less competitive markets are likely to control a greater share of the market
demand for a good or service and face a lower price elasticity of demand (relative to firms
in more competitive markets). As we will eventually illustrate, this means that firms in less
competitive markets should have greater ability to raise the price of their goods or services
above marginal cost. In other words, firms in less competitive markets should have
relatively higher market power and profitability. In the following paragraphs, we will
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demonstrate how the level of competition is negatively related to financial performance by
first examining the relationship between market share and profitability and then examining
the relationship between the price elasticity of demand and profitability.
As stated above, a firm in a less competitive market typically controls a greater
share of the market demand for a good or service relative to a firm in a more competitive
market. This occurs because less competitive markets generally have fewer firms
competing over the total market demand. Ultimately, we argue that having a greater share
of the market demand is one reason that firms in less competitive markets should be
relatively more profitable. To illustrate this point, let’s say that there are two separate
markets for hospital services. Each market is assumed to be identical, other than the fact
that one of the markets is much more competitive because it contains more hospitals
competing against one another for patients. Furthermore, let’s assume that the hospitals in
each market have the same cost structure. The situation facing an individual hospital in the
less competitive market and the situation facing a hospital in the more competitive market
are shown on the same graph below. The hospital in the less competitive market faces
demand curve dLC, while the hospital in the more competitive market faces demand curve
dMC. The demand curve dLC is to the right of the demand curve dMC because the hospital in
the less competitive market is able to control a greater share of the market demand at every
price.
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Figure 1: This graph displays the difference in profitability for two hospitals with different market shares.

Both of the hospitals in the graph above will produce where marginal revenue
equals marginal cost. This occurs where MRLC = MC for the hospital in the less
competitive market and where MRMC = MC for the hospital in the more competitive
market. Note that the hospital facing less competition (and having a greater share of market
demand) charges higher prices (PLC) than the hospital facing more competition, which
charges PMC. Also note that the hospital facing less competition earns a higher profit (given
by the red and blue areas above) compared to the hospital facing more competition, which
earns economic profits equal to the area of the blue rectangle. Thus, using the graph above,
we have displayed that having a greater share of the market demand (via less competition)
leads to higher profits. In other words, we have displayed one reason why we expect a
negative relationship between competition and hospital financial performance.
As previously stated, firms in less competitive markets should also face a lower
price elasticity of demand relative to firms in more competitive markets. This occurs
because consumers have fewer options (substitutes) in the less competitive market and
6

thus, they tend to be less responsive to changes in price. Ultimately, the relationship
between a profit-maximizing firm’s price elasticity of demand and profitability can be
explained using the mathematical expression shown below. Note that this derivation of this
expression can be found in Appendix 1.

The left-hand side of this expression is the markup of price over marginal cost
(expressed as a percentage of price), while the right hand side is the inverse of the price
elasticity of demand. Thus, this expression shows that the price markup

should be

set equal the inverse of the price elasticity of demand in order to maximize profit.
Furthermore, it shows that there is an inverse relationship between the price markup and
the price elasticity of demand. For example, as price elasticity increases, the right side gets
smaller and thus, the price markup on the left side must get smaller. Therefore, we have
shown a second reason why we expect a negative relationship between competition and
hospital financial performance. Specifically, hospitals in less competitive markets will face
a lower price elasticity of demand, which means that they can have a higher price markup
over marginal cost than hospitals in more competitive markets. Since the price markup
over cost is one indicator of profitability, this means that hospitals in less competitive
markets are more profitable (i.e. they perform better financially).
In summary, theory indicates that a lower level of market competition typically
results in an individual firm having a higher share of the market demand and a lower price
elasticity of demand; both of which increase the ability of a firm to charge higher prices
and earn higher profits. Thus, we expect that there should be a negative relationship
between the level of competition in the market and hospital financial performance. This is
7

important to our discussion of hospital consolidation because if consolidating hospitals are
able to reduce competition by merging, then, in theory, they should be able to improve
their financial performance (holding everything else constant). In addition, if hospital
mergers reduce competition, then consumer welfare should decrease in the short run due to
an increase in the price of hospital care. As we will discuss later, this is the negative
implication of hospital consolidation for society and it may lead anti-trust officials to
prevent consolidation from occurring. However, it is also possible that there will be
positive long-term effects for consumers. In particular, less competition and improved
financial performance may mean that hospitals become more viable in the long run and can
afford to provide higher quality services (e.g. through updating medical technology). Antitrust officials must determine whether this is really the case in making decisions with
regards to hospital consolidation.

2.2 Efficiency
Hospital efficiency is our second variable of interest because we have hypothesized
that hospital consolidation will have an impact on this variable. However, before
illustrating the impact of consolidation on efficiency, we will discuss efficiency and its
relationship with hospital financial performance. Note that for any firm, efficiency is at its
highest when the firm produces the maximum level of output with a given level of inputs.
Alternatively, we could say that the most efficient firms are able to produce a given level
of output with a minimum level of inputs or at a minimum cost.
We can determine the most efficient combination of inputs for producing a given
level of output by using isocost and isoquant curves. For example, say a hospital that
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provides surgical services must determine how much capital (medical technology) and
labor (nurses/doctors) it should use in providing a given number of surgical services. The
hospital’s production function for providing surgical services is Q S = f (KS, LS), where QS
is the number of surgical services provided, KS is the number of capital hours devoted to
surgical services, and LS is the number of labor hours devoted to surgical services. Now
assume that the hospital will provide 1000 surgical services for this time period and thus, it
is on the isoquant QS = 1000 in figure 2 below. The hospital may, for instance, start at a
point like A where the isoquant QS = 1000 intersects the isocost line labeled TC1.
However, point A is clearly not a point of maximum efficiency because we can move
upward along QS = 1000 to get to a lower isocost line. Thus, to improve efficiency the
hospital exchanges labor hours for capital hours until it gets to point B, where there is a
tangency between the isocost line TC0 and the isoquant line QS = 1000. At this point, the
marginal rate of technical substitution of labor for capital is equal to the ratio of the price
of labor to the price of capital (w/r) and the hospital is providing a given level of services
at the lowest total cost.

Figure 2: This graph shows how inputs should be allocated in order to maximize efficiency.
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Clearly, by moving from point A to point B and becoming more efficient, the
hospital has improved its financial performance. To see this, note that economic profit is
equal to total revenue minus total cost and in this case, total revenue has not changed
(since QS has not changed), but total cost has decreased by becoming more efficient. Thus,
profit must increase when moving from A to B and we have shown a positive relationship
between hospital efficiency and hospital financial performance.
However, it is important to recognize that, for hospitals, maximizing efficiency
often involves allocating inputs among multiple hospital services (i.e. multiple hospital
outputs). For example, hospitals may need to determine how much medical technology and
nurses should be allocated between providing surgical services and providing routine
services. Ultimately, we can display an efficient allocation of inputs among multiple
services by using an Edgeworth box (Hyman, 1986).
In constructing an Edgeworth box, we will assume that hospitals only provide two
different kinds of services (surgical services and routine services) and only have two inputs
to provide these services (capital and labor). We also assume that hospitals have CobbDouglass production functions, like the ones below, for producing the two services. These
production functions imply that the hospitals’ isoquants will be convex. Note that QS is the
number of surgical services provided, QR is the number of routine services provided, KS
and LS are the number of capital hours and labor hours utilized for surgical services, and
KR and LR are the number of capital hours and labor hours utilized for routine services.

The total number of capital hours and labor hours per time period are assumed to be fixed
and fully utilized in the hospital. Thus, KS + KR = K and LS + LR = L, where K is the total
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number of capital hours available and L is the total number of labor hours available.

Figure 3: An Edgeworth box displaying allocations of inputs between multiple services.

The height of the Edgeworth box (shown above) is the total available labor hours
and the width of the box is the total available capital hours. The number of labor hours
used in the provision of surgical services (L S) is measured upward from the origin 0, while
the number of capital hours used to provide surgical services (KS) is measured rightward
from the origin 0. On the other hand, the number of labor hours used in the provision of
routine services (LR) is measured downward from the origin 0’, while the number of
capital hours used to provide routine services (KR) is measured leftward from the origin 0’.
Note that each point inside the box represents an allocation of the given amount of inputs
to the provision of the two services (Hyman, 1986). Also notice that the isoquants for
surgical services are plotted such that isoquants farther northeast from the origin 0
represent higher provision levels for surgical services. Furthermore, we see that the
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isoquants for routine services have been rotated 180 degrees so that isoquants farther
southwest from the origin 0’ represent higher provision levels for routine services.
Now suppose that a hospital starts at point C, where the intersecting isoquants
indicate that the hospital is providing 1000 surgical services and 500 routine services per
time period. At point C,

and

are used to provide surgical services and

and

are

used to provide routine services. However, point C is not an efficient allocation of inputs
because we could easily reallocate the inputs to provide more of one or both services
without lowering the amount of either service provided. In other words, at C we are not
maximizing output given our inputs. To improve efficiency, one option is to move along
the isoquant QS = 1000 to point D. In this case, labor hours are shifted from routine
services to surgical services, while capital hours are shifted from surgical services to
routine services. This results in an increase in the number of routine services provided,
since we move to a higher routine services isoquant (QR = 700), but no change in surgical
services since we stay on the same surgical services isoquant. At point D, Q R = 700 and QS
= 1000 are tangent, indicating that the marginal rate of technical substitution of capital for
labor for each of the two “outputs” are equal at that point. This meets the condition for
maximizing efficiency because we are maximizing the provision of one of the services,
given the provision of the other service and the fixed amount of inputs available. Thus, we
have now shown what constitutes a fully efficient allocation of inputs among multiple
services.
We would imagine that if one hospital is operating at a point like C, while another
is operating at a point like D, then the hospital at D should perform better financially. This
is due to the fact that the hospital at D provides 200 more routine services than the hospital
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at C, even though both hospitals use the same amount of inputs and have the same
provision of surgical services. In other words, the hospital at D should generate more total
revenue then the hospital at C, while having the same total cost, which indicates that
profits (TR – TC) must be higher for the more efficient hospital at D. This is assuming that
the hospital at D continues to operate on the elastic portion of its demand curve when it
provides a higher level of routine services. Even if this is not the case, we would expect
that the more efficient hospital could instead produce 500 routine services, but at a lower
total cost then the less efficient hospital. Either way we find a positive relationship
between efficiency and hospital financial performance. Note that in the long run more
efficient hospitals will not only perform better financially, they will also be more likely to
remain viable and cope with changes in the health care industry. For example, more
efficient hospitals will be better able to withstand changes brought on by recent
regulations, such as the Affordable Care Act.
It is important to point out that hospital consolidation may be one mechanism for
hospitals to move from less efficient to more efficient points in the Edgeworth box. In
other words, hospital consolidation could allow for an efficient change in the allocation of
inputs. This could occur if consolidation allows for a reallocation of resources across
hospital facilities or if it generates a transfer of knowledge with regards input allocation.
Overall, an efficient reallocation of inputs following consolidation would result in an
increase in profitability. Note that this is a very incomplete discussion of the potential
efficiency gains from consolidation; however, the next section of this chapter will present a
much more detailed analysis of this topic.
Before concluding our discussion of efficiency, it is important to recognize that
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there is likely to be a relationship between hospital size and hospital efficiency. Hospital
size becomes important in examining efficiency and the costs of production for hospitals
because many hospitals can be characterized as having economies of scale over an
extended portion of their long run average cost curve. Essentially, economies of scale exist
in the hospital industry because most hospitals require expensive medical technology to
provide services and the amount of this expensive medical technology often does not
depend on the level of output. For instance, the hospital may only need one x-ray machine
regardless of the level of output they produce. These costly fixed inputs make it
advantageous for hospitals to spread fixed inputs over more output. In other words,
hospitals that can increase output will move down along the long run average cost curve
and achieve a lower level of average costs. Note that larger hospitals with more beds and
admissions are able to provide higher levels of output that can move them down along the
long run average cost curve, as shown in the graph below. We argue that a small sized
hospital would be operating at a point like S, while a larger hospital would be operating at
a point like L because larger hospitals are able to take advantage of economies of scale that
exist in the hospital industry due to large fixed costs.

Figure 4: Long-run average costs for a larger hospital (L) and a smaller hospital (S).
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Thus, it seems that as hospital size increases, long run average costs decrease.
Ultimately, this indicates a positive relationship between size and efficiency, which leads
us to expect a positive relationship between hospital size and hospital financial
performance. As we will see, the benefits of larger hospital size and economies of scale
become important factors in generating efficiency gains for consolidating hospitals.

2.3 The Effects of Hospital Consolidation on Efficiency and Competition
Now that we have established the theoretical relationship between hospital financial
performance and our two variables of interest, competition and efficiency, we can move
into an analysis of the impact of hospital consolidation on these two variables. Note that
once we establish the theoretical impact that hospital consolidation has on efficiency and
competition, then we can use the analysis from the previous pages to determine the
ultimate impact of hospital consolidation on hospital financial performance.
Oliver E. Williamson provides us with a very straightforward model to display the
theoretical change in efficiency and competition resulting from the consolidation/merger of
two hospitals (Williamson, 1968). Williamson’s model will also allow us to visualize the
trade-off between efficiency and competition that is faced by society as a whole as a
consequence of a merger. In Williamson’s model, we begin by assuming that the market is
perfectly competitive before the merger occurs. Thus, the individual hospitals in the market
will be price-takers with no market power. Note that this assumption is fairly unrealistic
because no market for hospital care can be characterized as perfectly competitive. In fact,
most of the conditions characterizing perfect competition are violated by these markets.
For instance, most markets for hospital care have few sellers, barriers to entry and exit, and
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heterogeneous products (due to differences in the quality of care across hospitals). Most
economists would instead characterize markets for hospital care as monopolistically
competitive or even oligopolistic. While this may be the case, in our discussion here, we
will continue to assume that the market starts as perfectly competitive because Williamson
believed that this assumption was important to simplify the analysis and more clearly
display the results of a merger.
Williamson’s model also assumes that marginal cost and average cost are constant
and are the same across all firms in the market. In other words, the marginal and average
cost curves are represented by the same horizontal line for each firm. The graph below
displays the situation in the market before consolidation. For simplification, we assume
that the market is only made up of two perfectly competitive hospitals.

Figure 5: Williamson Trade-Off Model prior to consolidation.

Market equilibrium is represented in figure 5 above by the intersection between the market
demand curve and the horizontal line labeled MC1 = AC1 (Point A). In this case, the two
hospitals provide a total of Q1 services and earn normal profits since the market price is
currently equal to each hospital’s average cost.
16

However, say the two separate hospitals that were competing against one another
now decide to merge. According to Williamson, there are two outcomes that result from
this merger. The first outcome of the merger is that the two hospitals now combine to
become more efficient. In other words, the combined hospitals can now provide any given
quantity of services at a lower cost than if they were still separate entities. The graph below
displays this change by shifting the pre-merger marginal and average cost curve labeled
MC1 = AC1 down to the post-merger marginal and average cost curve labeled MC2 = AC2.
Price

C

Post- m erger P
2
Price

A1

Competitive
P1
Price

MC = AC 1
1

A2
D

A

B
MC = AC
2

2

Dem and
MR2

Q2
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Quantity

Figure 6: The full Williamson Trade-Off Model.

Note that hospital consolidation may generate efficiency gains in a couple different
ways. One way efficiency gains may result from consolidation is through the elimination
of duplicative services. For example, following consolidation, many hospitals will
concentrate very costly and highly specialized medical services in one hospital facility
rather than having both locations provide the exact same service (Sprang et al., 2009).
Thus, each hospital simply refers patients to the other hospital if they do not happen to
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provide the service/procedure anymore. By doing this, the consolidated hospitals are able
to reduce duplicative medical technology and staff while increasing the utilization of the
remaining equipment and staff, which should improve efficiency and lower average costs.
Essentially, we are arguing that eliminating duplicative services enables consolidated
hospitals to take advantage of economies of scale. Specifically, by concentrating highly
specialized services in one physical location, hospitals are able to spread more output over
the remaining expensive fixed inputs used in providing the service. This has the effect of
moving the hospitals down along the long-run average cost curve shown in the graph
below. Note that before consolidation, each hospital was at point H providing q1 highly
specialized services at a long-run average cost of LRAC1. After consolidation, however,
only one hospital facility provides the particular service, which allows that facility to
“produce” at point J, where total output is q2 and long-run average cost is LRAC2.
Ultimately, the movement seen on the graph below will happen for the other hospital
facility if it is able to be the sole provider of other highly specialized services. 2

Figure 7: Movement down the LRAC curve as a result of eliminating duplicative services.

18
2. Note: we are not making a “diseconomies of scope” argument (i.e. TC(Q1, Q2) ˃ [TC(Q1, 0) + TC(0, Q2)]). Rather, our
18
duplication argument is that [TC( Q1, Q2) + TC( Q1, Q2)] ˃ [TC(Q1, 0) + TC(0, Q2)], where Q1 and Q2 are different services.

A second way consolidation can generate efficiency gains is through “purchasing
economies.” In other words, consolidating hospitals may be able to purchase medical
inputs/materials at lower prices by combining purchases (increasing order size) to receive
bulk-buying discounts. Note that consolidating hospitals can also lower medical
input/material prices because they now have more bargaining power when creating
contracts with medical input suppliers. Both of these factors result in efficiency gains
because they would allow consolidating hospitals to provide a given level of services at a
lower total cost. In addition, a reduction in the cost of medical inputs would imply that the
cost of treating each patient is likely to be lower and thus, marginal cost is lower at every
quantity. This can be shown in Williamson’s model by the decrease in the marginal and
average cost curve from MC1 = AC1 to MC2 = AC2.
Finally, consolidation may improve efficiency and produce cost-savings by
allowing consolidating hospitals to downsize administrative units (Folland et al., 2010).
This often occurs when the administration of one of the hospitals is eliminated or reduced
following consolidation and the administration of the other hospital manages the combined
entity. If this is the case, then fixed administrative costs are being reduced and remaining
administrative costs are being spread out over more output to lower average costs.
However, it is important to note that the remaining administration needs to be able to
handle the increase in responsibility in order for cost-savings to occur. Also note that
similar cuts may be made in departments such as medical records, billing, or accounting
following consolidation.
While it seems that hospital consolidation can only improve efficiency at this point,
we must recognize that there may be certain issues and sources of inefficiency created
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when consolidating hospitals attempt to cut costs. For instance, the combined entity may
not be as efficiently managed if it eliminates administrative units. In particular, we must
consider how much the remaining administration knows about the operations of both
hospitals. Furthermore, if the combined entity eliminates duplicative services in an attempt
to increase efficiency, then patients might end up having to travel farther to receive
hospital care or be forced to go back and forth between hospitals. Note that reducing
duplication may also increase waiting times for services and all of these issues could cause
the consolidated hospitals to lose patients.
Now that we have discussed the efficiency outcome of consolidation, we need to
return to the Williamson Trade-Off Model to examine the second outcome that Williamson
mentions. The second outcome resulting from a merger, according to Williamson, is that
there is a loss of competition in the market and an increase in market power for the
merging hospitals. This occurs because the two hospitals are no longer competing with
each other and can now collaborate in setting prices. Ultimately, the hospitals will no
longer be price-takers and their combined marginal revenue curve should now be
downward sloping. This is displayed in the Williamson Trade-Off Model (figure 6) by
shifting/rotating the marginal revenue curve down to MR2. Essentially, the market can now
be characterized as a monopoly.
The profit-maximizing hospitals will now produce where the post-merger marginal
revenue curve, MR2, intersects the post-merger marginal cost curve, MC2 (see point B in
figure 6). This results in a new price, P2, which is higher than our original price, P1, and a
new quantity of services, Q2, which is lower than the original quantity, Q1. Therefore,
Williamson’s model tells us that the merger should lead to an increase in price and a
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restriction in total output. Note that this is in agreement with our discussion of competition,
which indicated that a loss of competition in the market should result in higher hospital
prices due to an increase in market share and a decrease in the price elasticity of demand.
Overall, the decrease in average costs (from increased efficiency) and the increase
in price (from a reduction in competition) allow the consolidated hospitals to earn a total
economic profit equal to the rectangle P2CBD following the merger. Note that before the
merger, hospitals were earning only normal profits. Thus, according to Williamson’s
model, the merger has allowed the consolidating hospitals to improve their financial
performance. This means that Williamson’s theory has supported our first hypothesis that
hospital consolidation leads to an improvement in hospital financial performance by
increasing efficiency and reducing competition.

2.4 The Trade-Off of Hospital Consolidation for Society
In the previous section, we were able to use Williamson’s model to illustrate how
hospital consolidation leads to improvements in financial performance. However,
Williamson’s original intention for the model was to display the trade-off produced by
mergers for society. Thus, we now turn our attention to examining this trade-off using
Williamson’s model, which is reproduced below.
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A2 ↑

Figure 8: The Williamson Trade-Off Model

Notice that we have shaded in two regions on the graph above labeled A1 and A2
(red and blue areas, respectively). The area designated A1 is the dead-weight loss, or loss in
consumer surplus, that results from the increase in price from P1 to P2 and the restriction in
output from Q1 to Q2. Of course, this decline in consumer welfare is the undesirable impact
of the merger for society. On the other hand, the blue area labeled A2 is the cost-savings
(or the increase in producer surplus due to lower production costs) resulting from the
merger. These cost-savings are the desirable impact of the merger for society because
resources are saved and can be used productively somewhere else. Therefore, we find that
the net welfare effect of the merger is shown by the difference in the areas of the two
regions (i.e. net welfare effect = A2 – A1). Notice, that area of triangle A1 is given by
0.5∙(P2 - P1)∙(Q1 - Q2) and the area of rectangle A2 is given by (MC1 – MC2)∙Q2. Thus, the
net welfare effect will be positive if the following inequality holds:
(MC1 – MC2)Q2 – 0.5(P2 - P1)(Q1 - Q2) > 0
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This inequality tells us that if the cost-savings from improved efficiency are greater
than the decline in consumer surplus from the loss of competition, then the merger is
beneficial to society as a whole. On the other hand, if the decrease in competition lowers
consumer surplus enough to dominate any cost-savings from efficiency improvements,
then the merger is harmful to society. Thus, the model demonstrates that the problem
facing anti-trust officials is determining which effect is greater. If total cost-savings are
greater than the dead-weight loss (A2 > A1), then they should take no action to prevent the
merger. However, if the dead-weight loss is greater than the cost-savings (A2 < A1), then
anti-trust officials should act to prevent the merger from occurring. Overall, the
Williamson Trade-Off Model supports our second hypothesis that there is a trade-off
created by hospital consolidation between efficiency gains and losses in consumer welfare
due to increasing prices. However, Williamson’s model does not indicate whether the
efficiency effect or competition effect will dominate in this trade-off.
It is important to note that not everyone agrees with Williamson’s theory when it
comes to hospital consolidation. In particular, hospital merger advocates propose that
mergers create no trade-off for society (Connor et al., 1998). They agree with Williamson
that efficiency is improved through consolidation, but they argue that efficiency gains are
passed on to the consumer in the form of lower prices. In other words, they argue that the
level of competition in hospital markets is high enough that efficiency gains are used by
consolidating hospitals to lower prices in an attempt to outcompete other hospitals. We can
display a merger advocate’s theory using the graph below.
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Figure 9: A graph displaying the Merger Advocate Theory.

We assume that the market was perfectly competitive before the merger and the hospitals
produced a total of Q1 services and charged a price of P1. Notice that the post-merger price
P2 is actually lower than the perfectly competitive price P 1 because of the large drop in
marginal cost and the relatively elastic demand curve. Furthermore, we see that the blue
box is the cost-savings, while the red triangle is the gain in consumer surplus. Thus, no
trade-off has occurred and the merger results in a net benefit to society.
Many merger advocates also point out that health care markets do not function like
markets in other sectors. They note that the existence of health insurance allows consumers
to be “fairly insulated from the direct cost of health care, making them insensitive to price”
(Conner et al., 1998). Thus, merger advocates argue that any losses in consumer welfare
are likely to be exaggerated. However, we believe that this argument neglects the fact that
there are indirect consequences of higher hospital prices for consumers with health
insurance. In particular, if the prices that hospitals charge go up, then insurance companies
are also likely to raise their rates in order to compensate for having to make higher
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payments to hospitals. This adversely affects those who buy health insurance in insurance
markets and also those who get insurance through their employer (due to decreased net
wages, layoffs, etc).

2.5 Post-Consolidation Profit Maximization with Two Hospital Facilities
Using the Williamson Trade-Off Model, we were able to hypothetically show the
aggregate output (i.e. the aggregate quantity of services) that two consolidated hospitals
would provide and the aggregate profit that the hospitals would earn. 3 However, we did not
display how the combined hospitals would allocate the provision of the aggregate output
between the two separate hospital facilities. Thus, in the discussion that follows, we will
demonstrate how the combined entity would choose to allocate the provision of a total
quantity of services between two facilities in order to maximize profit.
To start, we assume that the combined entity operates two hospital facilities
(hospital A and hospital B) that have different cost structures, as shown in graph (a) and
graph (b) below. Hospital A has the average cost curve ACA and the marginal cost curve
MCA, while hospital B has the average cost curve AC B and the marginal cost curve MCB.
Graph (c) shows the aggregate marginal cost curve (MC) for the combined entity, which is
derived from the horizontal summation of the marginal cost curves of the individual
hospital facilities. Graph (c) also shows the demand curve (D) and the marginal revenue
curve (MR) facing the combined entity. Note that these curves look similar to how they
were drawn in the Williamson Trade-Off Model following consolidation.
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3. For hospitals, output means a quantity of services or procedures
25 provided during a fixed period of time. Thus, we use
output and amount of services provided synonymously in this discussion.

B

Figure 10: A diagram displaying the optimal allocation of output between two hospital facilities.

In order to maximize profits, the combined entity will provide the level of total
output where the aggregate marginal cost curve (MC) intersects the marginal revenue
curve (i.e. at point E in graph (c)). Thus, the combined hospital will provide a total of q*
services at a price of P*. However, the combined hospital must now decide how much of
q* will be provided at each hospital facility in order to minimize the costs of providing
services. As it turns out, the optimal allocation of q* services between the facilities will
occur where the marginal cost of each facility is equal to the aggregate marginal cost of
combined entity at the profit-maximizing level of total output. In other words, the
combined entity wants to “produce” where MCA = MCB = MC = MR. If MCA ˃ MCB, then
the combined entity can reduce total costs and increase profits by providing more services
at facility B and less at facility A. The opposite applies if MC B ˃ MCA because additional
services can be provided at a lower cost if we transfer services from hospital B to hospital
A.
Note that we have drawn a horizontal line that goes through point E in order to
show where the equilibrium condition, MC A = MCB = MC = MR, is satisfied. This

26

horizontal line intersects hospital A’s marginal cost curve at the point EA and hospital B’s
marginal cost curve at the point EB. Ultimately, we find that the optimal allocation of the
profit maximizing output occurs where hospital A provides q A and hospital B provides qB.
Note that qA plus qB adds up to q* because the aggregate marginal cost curve (MC) was
obtained from the horizontal summation of the individual marginal cost curves. Also notice
that we display the profit generated by each of the two facilitates (the red areas). The profit
for hospital facility A is given by the rectangle DPBC, while the profit for hospital facility
B is given by rectangle HPFG. The total profit earned by the combined entity is simply the
sum of areas of these two rectangles. In other words, when providing q*, the combined
entity earns a total economic profit of DPBC + HPFG.
It is important to note that there are two connections between this diagram and the
Edgeworth box discussed previously. First, the diagram above displays how we can
efficiently allocate output between separate facilities; however, in allocating output we
must also allocate inputs between the facilities. Since we are reallocating inputs between
hospital A and hospital B, the dimensions of the Edgeworth box will change for each
facility. As the dimensions of the box change, we must find new points of tangency within
each Edgeworth box. This is the first connection between the two diagrams. The second
connection comes from the fact that the input allocations chosen within the Edgeworth box
for each hospital facility can affect the cost curves of each facility. For example, if hospital
A chooses inefficient allocations of inputs within its Edgeworth box then hospital A’s
marginal cost and average cost curves will be higher than if it had chosen efficient
allocations within its box. Ultimately, this means that the input allocation in the Edgeworth
box affects the allocation of the total output between the hospital facilities.
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2.6 Summary of the Competition and Efficiency Discussion
Thus far we have used microeconomic theory to determine that there is a negative
relationship between competition and financial performance and a positive relationship
between efficiency and financial performance. We have also used the Williamson TradeOff Model to demonstrate that hospital consolidation should decrease the level of
competition in the market and improve hospital efficiency. We showed that the decrease in
competition and increase in efficiency from consolidation should both lead to an
improvement in hospital financial performance, as we hypothesized in our introduction. In
addition, we displayed the trade-off of consolidation for society between the competition
effect and the efficiency effect using Williamson’s model. Lastly, we illustrated how two
merged hospitals would divide the total output between two hospital facilities in order to
maximize total profits. The rest of this theoretical analysis will discuss the relevant control
variables that will eventually join competition and efficiency in our conceptual model of
hospital financial performance.

2.7 Control Variables:
2.7.1 The Quality of Hospital Services
In formulating our conceptual model of hospital financial performance, we must
control for the other variables that influence financial performance. One of these variables
is the quality of a hospital’s services, which we assume does not change in response to
consolidation. Hospital quality is sometimes represented by characteristics such as the
beauty of facilities and the expertise or prestige of physicians and nurses (Folland et al.,
2010). However, patients often do not know what quality of care they will receive when
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they enter a hospital. For instance, they have no idea whether their surgery will be properly
performed or whether the doctors will make the correct diagnosis. Thus, there is
uncertainty for patients with regards to the quality of hospital care they will be provided.
This problem of quality uncertainty is addressed by George Akerlof in his article
“The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality, Uncertainty, and the Market Mechanism” (Akerlof,
1970). In Akerlof’s article, he uses the market for used cars to demonstrate quality
uncertainty. He assumes that there are good used cars and bad used cars (lemons), but used
car buyers are unable to access whether any used car is of a high quality or low quality
because important aspects of car quality are not accessible for inspection. Thus, used car
buyers are forced to guess that any used car is of average quality. This means that used
cars, good or bad, will sell at same average price. However, sellers who know that their
used car is of a higher quality will not be willing to sell at the average price. Therefore,
when buyers are only willing to pay an average price, sellers of high quality used cars will
not place their cars on the market. Ultimately, the withdrawal of good cars lowers the
average quality in the market and buyers eventually lower the price they are willing to pay
for any used car. This drives out sellers of mediocre used cars and the process repeats until
the market is almost non-existent.
Likewise, in the market for hospital care, patients find it difficult to assess the
quality of care they will receive before the hospital services are provided. Thus, it appears
that they will guess that any service will be provided at an average level of quality. Like in
the used car market, this seems to imply that prices gravitate towards an average price.
This also seems to imply that high quality hospitals ultimately decide that providing this
high level of quality is not worthwhile since they receive about the same price as everyone
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else. However, in our discussion thus far we have ignored the fact that there is a key factor
that prevents hospitals from being indifferent to quality and receiving the same price. This
factor is a hospital’s reputation. Hospitals that provide higher quality services will
eventually develop a reputation of being a high quality hospital. For instance, if a
hospital’s patients are diagnosed properly and their procedures are almost always
performed correctly, then patients will not only return to that same hospital the next time
they need hospital care, but they will also inform others of the high quality care they
received. On the other hand, a low quality hospital is likely to lose returning patients and
lose credibility in the long run as word spreads about the quality of its services. Thus, we
find that hospitals have the incentive to keep quality high because it allows hospitals to
build a good reputation and retain patients (as well as bring in new patients).
Thus far we have said that quality has implications for a hospital’s reputation; but
now we must discuss the relationship between quality and hospital financial performance.
To start, we argue that quality and reputation will affect the demand curve faced by a
hospital. Specifically, a hospital that provides high quality services will build a good
reputation, which means that consumers should be willing to pay more for its services.
This ultimately allows the hospital to charge higher prices for any given quantity of
services provided. The graph below displays this by shifting the demand curve D AR
(demand if average reputation) up to the demand curve DHR (demand if high reputation).
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Figure 11: The effect of quality on economic profits.

Notice that with a high reputation the hospital will charge a higher price (PHR) and also
provide a higher level of output (QHR) than if the hospital had an average reputation.
Furthermore, assuming the hospital’s cost structure remains the same, a higher reputation
leads to higher profits (Profit HR) compared to the average reputation profit of Profit AR (the
blue area in figure 11). Overall, we find that higher quality improves reputation, which
increases demand and allows hospitals to raise financial performance. Thus, we have
established a positive relationship between quality and hospital financial performance.

2.7.2 Ownership Structure
Another factor that we will control for in our model of hospital financial
performance is hospital ownership structure. We can break hospital ownership down into
three different types: for-profit ownership, nonprofit ownership, and government
ownership. Each type of ownership has advantages and disadvantages that affect
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performance. For example, nonprofit hospitals are unable to distribute their net income and
thus, one disadvantage that nonprofit hospitals face is the inability to raise capital by
issuing equity stock (Folland et al., 2010). In theory, this should limit the ability of
nonprofit hospitals to finance projects and respond to changes in market conditions.
However, nonprofit hospitals do have the advantage of being exempt from all corporate,
property, and sales taxes.
Like nonprofits, government owned hospitals have the advantage of being exempt
from federal income taxation, but they have the disadvantage of being unable to generate
capital by issuing stock. In other words, government owned hospitals must rely on debt if
they want to finance projects. Finally, unlike nonprofit and government owned hospitals,
for-profit hospitals have the advantage of being able to issue stock to raise capital.
However, they are not exempt from any of the taxes mentioned above.
It is interesting to note that about seven percent of nonprofit hospitals converted to
for-profits between 1970 and 1995, and the conversion rate has been increasing in recent
years (Folland et al., 2010). The conversion of many nonprofit hospitals into for-profit
hospitals has seemingly supported the theory that it is more advantageous to be a for-profit
hospital. In other words, it seems many nonprofit hospitals are concluding that for-profits
are better able to remain viable in the long-run. Ultimately, we are led to hypothesize that
for-profit hospitals are able to perform better financially than nonprofit and government
owned hospitals primarily by having greater access to capital.
It is interesting to note that there is debate over whether for-profits have a greater
incentive to maximize financial performance relative to nonprofits and government
entities. For instance, one can argue that for-profits have a greater incentive to maximize
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financial performance because they have a “duty” to shareholders. Furthermore, an
argument can be made that for-profits are better able to incentivize managers through
mechanisms like stock options. Lastly, it is possible that nonprofits and government
entities have different standards/policies than for-profits, which can influence the relative
financial performance of the different types of ownership. For example, most nonprofit and
government owned hospitals refuse to deny or reduce care to those with very little ability
to pay for the care they receive. For-profit hospitals, on the other hand, may turn away
patients who are uninsured because they know that these patients will find it difficult to
pay their bill. If this is the case, then our hypothesis stated above would only be
strengthened. However, it is important to recognize that there is limited evidence that forprofits turn away more patients or have greater incentive to maximize financial
performance.

2.7.3 Population Characteristics and Demographics
Much of the literature on hospital consolidation acknowledges the importance of
population characteristics and demographics by controlling for such variables in their
empirical models. In particular, the literature recognizes that the characteristics of the
population served by a hospital will likely have an effect on the payments that a hospital
receives for their services. For instance, Sprang et al. (2009) and Connor et al. (1998)
include population/demographic variables in their models, such as the area unemployment
rate, area population, and area income, because these variables are likely to affect demand,
prices, and the probability of receiving payments for services. As a result of the relevance
of population characteristics for the demand/price of hospital services, we have decided to
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include population characteristics in our model of hospital financial performance as a
control variable.
Note that the demand for hospital services is likely to increase or decrease with the
population characteristics and demographics of the market area because different
categories of people tend to have different preferences and needs for hospital services
(Hubbard & O’Brien, 2010). The most relevant example is the age of the population. As
age increases, health issues tend to arise more frequently, which leads to greater demand
for hospital care. Furthermore, demand may vary with characteristics like market area
income and unemployment because these variables reflect the ability of consumers to pay
for hospital services. Overall, we can say that variations in these factors across different
markets will change the position of the market and individual hospital demand curves,
which will affect the prices that hospitals charge and ultimately, hospital financial
performance.
It is also important to recognize that the age of the population will alter the
percentage of Medicare patients for each hospital, which, in turn, can affect hospital
financial performance. Medicare is a social insurance program, administered by the U.S.
federal government, that guarantees access to health insurance for Americans aged 65 and
older (Folland et al., 2010). Medicare has a “prospective payment system,” which means
that hospitals receive a pre-determined price for different categories of care, regardless of
the actual amount of care received by the Medicare patient. These prices/payments are
notoriously low as a way to control Medicare costs (Kaestner & Guardado, 2008). In fact,
Bill Sheron (CEO at Wooster Community Hospital) estimates that Medicare pays only 35
to 40 percent of the hospital’s full price for a given service (Sheron & Boyes, 2014). Thus,
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hospitals must frequently absorb losses due to Medicare payments that are less than the
costs of providing services. Essentially, we are proposing that hospital financial
performance declines as a hospital’s percentage of Medicare patients increases because
hospitals are not able to receive adequate payments for the services they provide to these
patients.
It is important to note that Medicaid payments to hospitals are also notoriously low.
Thus, we also expect a negative relationship between a hospital’s percentage of Medicaid
patients and hospital financial performance. Ultimately, this examination of Medicare and
Medicaid will become more relevant when we are determining which variables should be
included in our empirical model. For now, we simply include Medicare and Medicaid
concerns in the population characteristics conceptual variable.

2.8 Conceptual Model and Conclusion to the Theory Section
The theoretical analysis conducted in this section indicates that our conceptual
model of hospital financial performance (HFP) is as follows:
HFP = f (Competition, Efficiency, Quality, Ownership Structure, Population Characteris.)
(-)
(+)
(+)
(?)
(?)
This conceptual model tells us that hospital financial performance is a function of the level
of competition in the market area, hospital efficiency, hospital quality, ownership structure,
and population characteristics and demographics. The signs below each variable indicate
the expected relationship between financial performance and each independent variable.
As a reminder, competition and efficiency are the variables of interest in this study because
we have hypothesized that hospital consolidation will have an impact on these variables.
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In summary, our theoretical analysis has determined that there is a negative
relationship between competition and financial performance and a positive relationship
between efficiency and financial performance. Furthermore, using the Williamson TradeOff Model, our analysis has illustrated that hospital consolidation should decrease
competition and increase hospital efficiency; both of which will improve hospital financial
performance. Note that William’s model has also shown that there is a trade-off of
consolidation for society, as we hypothesized in our introduction. Finally, the analysis in
this chapter has determined that hospital quality, hospital ownership structure, and
population characteristics are important factors that we should control for in our conceptual
model due to their influence on hospital financial performance. In the next section of this
study, we will examine the existing literature to determine whether our theoretical analysis
has carefully considered all of the important principles and variables related to hospital
consolidation.
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III. Review of Empirical Literature

3.0 Introduction to the Literature Section
In the past 20 years, there has been a great deal of research concerning the effect of
hospital consolidation on hospital costs and prices. However, little research has been
conducted on the direct implication of hospital consolidation for hospital financial
performance. Despite this fact, we still find that much of the existing literature on hospital
consolidation is relevant and useful in examining the focus of this study.
Therefore, this section of our study will present five articles that we find beneficial
in guiding our research. The first article by Sprang et al. (2009) examines the direct impact
of horizontal hospital consolidations on hospital efficiency and prices. The second article
by Connor et al. (1998) examines the effects of market concentration and hospital mergers
on hospital costs, prices, and financial performance. The third article by Dranove and
Lindrooth (2003) investigates whether hospital mergers and system acquisitions lead to
efficiency gains. The final two articles by Dranove (1998) and Harrison (2011) examine
the extent of economies of scale in the hospital industry. Dranove estimates economies of
scale in non-revenue producing departments, while Harrison estimates the potential and
realized cost savings from hospital mergers due to economies of scale.
These five articles will indicate that we have carefully considered all of the
important principles and variables related to hospital consolidation in our theory section. In
particular, this section will demonstrate that our conceptual model is related to and based
on the models found in the existing literature. Furthermore, the five articles that we review
will suggest ways that we can operationalize our conceptual variables and locate reliable
data. This will become important as try to construct our own empirical model.
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3.1 Heather Radach Sprang, Richard J. Arnould, and Gloria J. Bazzoli (2009)
In 2009, Sprang et al. published an article that examines the cost and price behavior
of consolidating hospitals before and after consolidation. Sprang et al. recognize that other
studies have previously explored the exact same behaviors of consolidating hospitals;
however, the authors write this article because they believe they can add to the existing
literature in a couple ways. One way the authors add to the existing literature is by using
data that extends over a long time period (10 years) and includes a large number of
hospitals (4160 unique hospitals to be exact). This is important because their data set has a
greater number of observations than previous studies, which should lead to more reliable
results. A second way the authors’ research adds to the existing literature is by including
both hospital mergers and hospitals acquired into multi-hospital systems (that already have
a hospital present in the market) in their analysis. This provides the authors with more
observations to evaluate the impacts of consolidation than previous studies which focus
solely on hospital mergers.
By examining cost and price behavior before and after consolidation, the authors
attempted to determine (1) the extent to which hospital consolidation generated efficiency
gains and (2) the ultimate effect of hospital consolidation on the price of hospital services.
Their research is very similar to our research in that we are both interested in the possible
efficiency improvements and price implications of hospital consolidation. Furthermore, we
both are concerned with the possible trade-off between efficiency gains and price increases
that can result from consolidation.
Sprang et al. never state a formal hypothesis with regards to the efficiency and
price outcomes of hospital consolidation. Rather they briefly mention the two opposing
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theories that we discussed in our theoretical analysis (i.e. Williamson’s theory and the
merger advocate theory) and they argue that their research will shed light on the debate
between these opposing theories. Furthermore, while the authors do not explicitly present
their conceptual models, we can infer what their conceptual models are by examining the
operationalized cost and price models they construct. We determined that their conceptual
models for hospitals costs and hospital prices are as follows (same independent variables
for each model):
Cost, Price = f (Market Power, Ownership Structure, Market Factors, Hospital Factors)
Note that while the authors are not directly concerned with hospital financial performance,
they still include conceptual variables in their models that we also determined to be
relevant for our model. For example, ownership structure and market power are both
included in our conceptual model, although we indicate market power using our
competition variable. Also note that conceptual variables we find relevant – such as
efficiency, quality, and population characteristics – may be included under “hospital
factors” and “market factors” in the authors’ conceptual models. However, we will later
mention the neglect of quality in their empirical model.
Ultimately, Sprang et al. developed the following operationalized cost and price
models:
Costit = β0 + β1HHIit + β2Mit + β3MSAit + β4Hit + δi + εit
Priceit = α0 + α1HHIit + α2Mit + α3MSAit + α4Hit + ρi + μit
In the cost model, the dependent variable Costit is measured by the log of total hospital
expenses per adjusted inpatient day, where adjusted inpatient days are calculated by
multiplying inpatient days by gross revenue, then dividing by inpatient revenue. On the
right hand side, HHIit is the log of the market area Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI),
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which serves as a measure of a hospital’s market power. Mit is a vector of merger variables,
which includes a before-merger dummy, an after-merger dummy, a before-merger/forprofit interaction variable, an after-merger/for-profit interaction variable, an aftermerger/HHI variable, and an after-merger/HHI/for-profit variable. Note that the for-profit
variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the hospital is for-profit (0 otherwise) and it
operationalizes ownership structure. The before-merger dummy equals 1 if the hospital has
not merged yet (but eventually will) and the after-merger dummy is equal to 1 if the
hospital has merged. If the hospital never merges, then each of these dummies equal 0.
Sprang et al. propose no formal hypothesis with regards to the sign of these merger
variables. However, if the coefficient on before-merger is significantly greater than the
coefficient on after-merger, then overall, hospital costs have declined as a result of hospital
consolidation, ceteris paribus.
Furthermore, in the cost model above, MSAit is a vector of market variables, which
includes the market wage index, the market unemployment rate, HMO penetration, and
population growth. Hit is the vector of hospital variables, which includes hospital
admissions (logged), occupancy rate, % Medicare, and % Medicaid. Occupancy rate is
used as a proxy for efficiency, while hospital admissions may proxy for hospital size
(which is a factor that influences efficiency). Note that a hospital’s percentage of Medicare
and Medicaid patients is something we may find to be important in our own empirical
model to take into account inadequate Medicare/Medicaid payments to hospitals.
In addition, in the cost model, δi is the fixed hospital component, which is included
because the authors use fixed effects estimation. εit is the error term and the subscript it is
hospital i in time t. For the price model, the dependent variable Priceit is measured by the
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log of net patient revenues per adjusted inpatient day. HHIit, Mit, MSAit, and Hit are
identical to the cost model, ρi is the fixed hospital component, and μit is the error term.
The primary source of data for the authors’ analysis was the American Hospital
Association (AHA) Annual Survey of Hospitals for 1988 – 1997. The authors also used
data reported in the Health Care Financing Administration’s Medicare Cost Reports to fill
gaps in AHA data and used the Bureau of Health Professions’ Area Resource File for data
on market characteristics. A total of 4160 hospitals are included in the data set, 125 of
which were involved in mergers and 1040 of which were involved in system acquisitions
over the 10 year period.
Since the authors used panel data, they ran a Hausman specification test to see if
random effects estimation could be used. The Hausman test indicated that random effects
estimation is not appropriate for either model and thus, fixed effects estimation should be
used instead. Note that fixed effects estimation is likely to be more appropriate in this case
because there are many unobservable hospital factors that the fixed effects model would
control for, but the random effects model would not control for. Thus, random effects
estimation might result in omitted variable bias. The authors’ mention that fixed effects
estimation can result in a substantial loss in degrees of freedom due to the inclusion of a
dummy variable for the number of hospitals minus one; however, they argue that this is not
an issue because their data is pooled over a long enough period of time (ten years).
Sprang et al. ran fixed effect regressions with robust standard errors on three
different specifications of their cost and price model. In the first specification, the only
merger variables were the before-merger and after-merger dummies. In the second
specification, the authors added the before-merger and after-merger variables interacted
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with the for-profit dummy variable to determine if consolidating for-profits exhibited
different price and cost behavior than consolidating nonprofits. In the final specification,
all merger variables were included to examine the impact of changes in market
concentration. Their cost regression results are shown in table 3.1 and their price
regression results are shown in table 3.2 (page 43).
Table 3.1: Corresponds to Table 2 in Sprang et al. (2009)

After running fixed effects regressions on the first specification, the authors found
that the coefficient for before-merger was 0.027 in the cost model and 0.023 in the price
model (both significant at the 1% level). Furthermore, the coefficient for after-merger was
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-0.016 (significant at 5% level) for the cost model and -0.010 (insignificant) for the price
model. Thus, without controlling for hospital ownership or market concentration changes,
the authors conclude that consolidating hospitals had higher costs and prices compared to
the average hospital before consolidating, but were able to lower costs and prices after
consolidating.
Table 3.2: Corresponds to Table 3 in Sprang et al. (2009)

After running the second specification with the before-merger/for-profit variable
and the after-merger/for-profit variable included, the authors determined that it was only
for-profit hospitals driving the cost and price behavior found in the first specification. In
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the cost regression, the coefficient on before-merger/for-profit was 0.061 and coefficient
on after-merger/for-profit was -0.061 (both significant at 1% level); while in the price
regression, the coefficient on before-merger/for-profit was 0.055 (significant at 1% level)
and coefficient on after-merger/for-profit was -0.002 (insignificant). These results show
that consolidating for-profit hospitals had significantly higher costs and prices before
merging, but were able to significantly lower costs and bring prices down to an average
level after merging. However, in both the price and cost regressions, the non-interacted
after merger and before merger variables were all insignificant. This shows that
consolidating non-profits did not exhibit any cost or price behavior significantly different
from the average hospital (before or after consolidation).
After running the third specification with after-merger/HHI/for-profit and aftermerger/HHI included, the authors found that price reductions resulting from efficiency
gains were mitigated by increases in market concentration (after-merger/HHI/for-profit
variable coefficient was 0.058 in the price model). In other words, the authors concluded
that there are market power effects through consolidation.
To conclude their empirical analysis, Sprang et al. used partial derivatives to
determine that there was a critical HHI value of 1595.59 and at this critical HHI value, the
after-merger effect on prices was 0. Below this critical HHI value, efficiency effects
seemed to dominate market power effects on prices (consolidation decreased prices).
However, above this critical value, market power effects seemed to dominate efficiency
effects on prices (consolidation increased prices). Overall, the authors concluded that
hospital consolidation results in significant efficiency gains in the case of for-profits, but
the ultimate effect on price depends on the level of competition in the market.
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While we believe that this is a strong article in terms of providing evidence on the
price and cost behavior of consolidating hospitals, we find that Sprang et al. could have
improved their research in a few areas. First, although this article was published in 2009,
the authors are using data from 1988 – 1997. We believe that up to date data is important
in the hospital industry due to constant changes in regulations, insurance coverage, and
market structure. Thus, we believe that results of Sprang et al. would be more relevant if a
more recent data set was used. Furthermore, we see that the authors have neglected the
impact of quality in their price model. We find this neglect of quality to be problematic
because failing to control for quality may led to biased estimates of regression coefficients.
Ultimately, by using a more recent data set and controlling for quality, we believe that we
can improve upon the research of Sprang et al.
Despite these critiques, we think that this article is helpful in guiding the design of
our own empirical research. In particular, this article suggests places where we might
locate reliable data on hospitals and hospital markets (such as the AHA Annual Survey of
Hospitals). Furthermore, it suggests that we can measure our competition variable using
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and ownership structure by simply using a dummy
variable. The article also suggests ways to distinguish between pre-consolidation behavior
and post-consolidation behavior, as well as ways of separating those hospitals that
consolidate from those hospitals that do not consolidate. Finally, the article leads us to
believe that a fixed effects model may be appropriate in the development of our own
empirical model.
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3.2 Robert A. Connor, Roger D. Feldman, and Bryan E. Dowd (1998)
In 1998, Connor et al. published an article that examines the effects of market
concentration and hospital mergers on hospital costs, prices, and profitability. Their
research was motivated by the lively debate between anti-trust advocates and merger
advocates concerning the implications of hospital consolidation for hospital efficiency and
consumer prices. Connor et al. note that previous hospital merger studies have not resolved
this debate because previous studies have produced mixed or ambiguous results when
investigating cost and price issues. Furthermore, the authors argue that there is a general
lack of research with regards to the price effects of consolidation. Thus, the authors’
research was designed to shed light on this important anti-trust debate by providing
additional evidence on the effects of hospital mergers and hospital market concentration.
In their article, Conner et al. attempt to answer several questions concerning market
concentration and hospital mergers. To begin, they ask “what is the relationship between
market concentration and hospital costs and prices?” and “how has this relationship
changed since the mid-1980s?” They also ask “what are the effects of hospital mergers on
hospital costs and prices?” and “how do these effects vary with certain market and hospital
characteristics?” The authors note that some previous market concentration studies have
been used to infer the results of potential mergers; however, the authors argue that this
indirect method for examining mergers is inappropriate because some merger effects are
not the result of increased market concentration. Thus, the authors decide that it is
necessary to examine the effects of market concentration and the effects of hospital
mergers separately in their study.
Upon seeing the questions that the authors look to answer, we find that their
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research is certainly related to our own research. Although we are ultimately concerned
with the effects of mergers/acquisitions on hospital financial performance, we find that the
best way to understand the relationship between consolidation and financial performance is
by examining the effects of hospital consolidation on costs and prices (i.e. efficiency and
competition). Thus, the authors’ primary concern with costs and prices is very relevant to
us. In fact, our own empirical work may involve decomposing the impact of consolidation
on financial performance into price and cost factors in order to estimate the efficiency and
competition aspects of consolidation. It is important to note that the authors estimate a
hospital profitability model in the article even though financial performance is not their
primary focus. This further displays the relevance of their research to our own research.
Similar to Sprang et al. (2009), Conner et al. briefly present the opposing theories
on the effects of consolidation rather than stating a formal hypothesis with regards to their
research questions. In addition, the authors do not explicitly present their conceptual
model, but we can infer what their conceptual model might be from their operationalized
cost, price, and “operating margin” models. We determined that their conceptual models
for hospitals costs, prices, and financial performance are as follows (same independent
variables for each model):
Cost, Price, Performance = f (Competition, Efficiency, Type of Hospital, Ownership
Structure, Market Input Prices, Other Market Factors, Other Hospital Factors)
Notice that competition, efficiency, and ownership structure are all variables that
we have included in our conceptual model. However, our model did not include a variable
for input prices or type of hospital (e.g. teaching, research, etc). Market input prices may
be relevant to our model, but we expect that higher market input prices would increase
both hospital costs and prices in the market, essentially cancelling out the effect on
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financial performance. In addition, we did not include type of hospital in our conceptual
model because we found no obvious theoretical relationship between the type of hospital
and financial performance. Note that in the authors’ conceptual model, quality and
population characteristics may be included under other hospital factors and other market
factors, respectively. However, we will later mention the neglect of quality in their
empirical study.
To operationalize their conceptual models, Connor et al. measured cost by the
average operating expense per admission, price by the average net patient revenue per
admission, and financial performance by net patient revenue divided by operating expenses
(their measure of operating margin). In addition, they quantified competition in the market
using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which is the sum of the squared market
shares over all hospitals in the market area. Note that the HHI will be their variable of
interest in the market concentration portion of their study. Furthermore, type of hospital
was quantified by using a dummy variable equal to 1 if the hospital was a teaching hospital
and, similarly, ownership structure was operationalized using a dummy variable equal to 1
if the hospital was a for-profit. Market input prices were measured by the area wage index
and efficiency was measured by the occupancy rate and admissions (to account for
efficiency gains from economies of scale). Other market variables included area
population, area per capita income, and area unemployment rate, while other hospital
variables included variables such as the hospital’s percentage of Medicare and Medicaid
patients.
The primary source of data for the authors’ analysis was the Health Care Financing
Administration (HCFA) PPS datasets for 1986 to 1994. In addition, information on which
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hospitals merged, hospital ownership, and type of hospital came from the American
Hospital Association annual survey datasets. Additional data for market variables came
from the Bureau of Health Profession’s 1994 Area Resource File. A total of 3,684
hospitals were included in the data set, 122 of which were involved in within-market
mergers.
Connor et al. divided their empirical research into two parts: a market concentration
study and a merger performance study. In the market concentration study, cross-sectional
models (one for each dependent variable) were estimated for 1986 and 1994 and
longitudinal models (one for each dependent variable) were estimated for 1986 – 1994 to
allow the authors to examine changes in health care markets over this time. In the crosssectional models, the dependent variables representing cost, price, and financial
performance were put in logarithmic form, as were the independent variables. In the
longitudinal models, all variables were put in logarithmic form and then put in first
difference form to examine cost and price inflation. For example, the average cost
dependent variable became

for the longitudinal

models. All models were estimated using OLS.
In the merger performance study, merger terms were added to the first difference
longitudinal models. Two separate model specifications were estimated (using OLS) with
different merger-related variables. The first specification included a merger dummy
variable with a value of 1 for hospitals that merged between 1986 and 1994 (0 otherwise).
The second specification included a merger variable divided into two time periods (to
separate older vs. newer mergers) along with a variable measuring the relative sizes of the
merging firms, a variable measuring the degree of pre-merger service duplication, and
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interaction terms between the merger variable and the HHI, occupancy rate, for-profit, and
teaching hospital variables.
In the regressions for the market concentration study, the R-squared values were
0.57 or above for all cost and price models and all models had significant F-tests. The
coefficients for HHI in the cost and price models (-0.0449 and -0.0536) were both negative
and significant at the 1% level in 1986. However, these coefficients became positive and
significant at the 10% level in 1994 (see tables 3.3 and 3.4 below). These results indicate
that, in 1986, lower market concentration (more competition) was actually associated with
higher costs and prices, but in 1994, lower concentration was associated with lower costs
and prices. Thus, the authors conclude that there must have been a shift from non-price
competition (i.e. competition based on quality) to price competition. They further conclude
that this shift was associated with increases in the number of price-sensitive buyers (in
particular, HMOs) after interacting HMO penetration with HHI in the longitudinal model.
Essentially, in less concentrated markets, increases in HMO penetration led to these
decreases in cost and price inflation. It is interesting to note that HHI showed no
relationship to “operating margin” (revenues/expense) because hospital costs and prices
followed the same trend.
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Table 3.3

Table 3.4
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In the first specification of the merger study regressions, the dummy merger
variable (1 = merged between 1986 and 1994) had a coefficient of -0.0547 in the cost
model and -0.0565 in the price model, both of which are significant at the 1% level (see
table 3.5 below). Thus, merging hospitals experienced approximately 5.5% less cost and
price inflation than non-merging hospitals from 1986 to 1994. Based on these results,
Connor et al. conclude that cost-savings from merging must have been passed on to
consumers in the form of lower prices rather than retained by the hospital. It is important to
note that the coefficient for the merger variable in the operating margin regression (0.0085) was insignificant, leading us to believe that mergers had little impact on hospital
financial performance.
Table 3.5

In the second specification, the authors found that hospital mergers resulted in
greater cost-savings if the merging hospitals were of similar size and had more service
duplication. This was determined by including the log of merger relative size and the log
of merger service duplication in the second specification and finding that both merger
relative size and merger service duplication had negative and significant coefficients at 1%
level. Like Sprang et al., the authors also concluded that the change in price from hospital
mergers depends on market concentration since the coefficient on the merger/HHI
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interaction term was 0.0448 (significant at 1% level). In other words, both Sprang et al.
and Connor et al. have found evidence that hospital consolidation is more likely to increase
prices at higher market concentration levels. In summary, Connor et al. find evidence that
hospital mergers lead to a reduction in hospital costs and consumer prices, but no change
hospital performance. This leads the authors to conclude that “the worst fears of anti-trust
advocates do not seem to have occurred.” However, they note that these results vary with
the degree on concentration in the market, the size of the merging hospitals, pre-merger
occupancy rates, and pre-merger duplication.
Overall, we find that Connor et al. have strong empirical models for analyzing the
effects of market concentration and hospital mergers on hospital costs, prices, and financial
performance. However, we would argue that while the authors have correctly included
most relevant variables, they, like Sprang et al., have neglected the impact of hospital
quality on hospital costs, prices, and profitability. We recognize that quality is difficult to
measure, but it is important to control for this variable in order to avoid bias in the
coefficients of the other included variables. In addition, the authors may have been able to
improve their study by using a better measure hospital financial performance. In other
words, we argue that simply dividing total revenue by total expenses may not be an
adequate financial performance indicator. However, we recognize that the authors were
primarily concerned with costs and prices, not financial performance.
While dividing revenue by expenses may not be the best way to measure financial
performance, we know that certain profitability measures may be inappropriate due to the
number of nonprofits in the hospital industry. Thus, this article is helpful in providing us
with one alternative to these unfeasible profitability measures. Furthermore, this article
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suggests other ways of measuring our independent variables that may be helpful. For
example, the article suggests that we could use the HHI to measure competition and the
occupancy rate as a proxy for efficiency. As previously discussed, this article also suggests
a way we could empirically estimate the efficiency and competition effects of
consolidation. That is, we may choose to have a financial performance model and separate
cost and price models that will allow us to decompose how consolidation is leading to
changes in financial performance. Lastly, this article provides us with another possible
source of data: the Health Care Financing Administration.

3.3 David Dranove and Richard Lindrooth (2003)
In 2003, Dranove and Lindrooth published an article in the Journal of Health
Economics that examined the impact of hospital consolidation on hospital efficiency. In
particular, the authors’ research directly compared the efficiency effects (cost savings) of
multi-hospital system acquisitions and local hospital mergers. Dranove and Lindrooth felt
their research was necessary because recent studies on hospital consolidation had failed to
provide unambiguous answers to the question of whether of consolidation generates
efficiency gains. Furthermore, the authors found that there was a lack of research that
examined system acquisitions and mergers separately. Note that the authors also argue that
they build on previous studies by using a new panel data set with a large number of
consolidating hospitals (244).
In the article, Dranove and Lindrooth attempt to answer the question “did hospital
mergers and system acquisitions lead to cost savings?” Sprang et al. (2009) and Connor et
al. (1998) asked a similar question in their research, but as we will see, Dranove and
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Lindrooth use a different empirical methodology and also specifically differentiate
between system acquisitions and hospital mergers in their analysis. We find the authors
concern with whether hospital consolidation leads to efficiency gains (cost savings) to be
very relevant to our own research, primarily because we are interested in whether
consolidating hospitals are able to improve financial performance by becoming more
efficient. In addition, because we are concerned with the trade-off of consolidation for
society, the authors concern with quantifying the efficiency side of the trade-off becomes
important to us.
Like Sprang et al. and Connor et al., Dranove and Lindrooth propose no formal
hypothesis with regards to the impact of consolidation on hospital costs. Rather it seems
that their research is purely exploratory and only interested in presenting statistical
evidence on this topic. In addition, the authors do not explicitly present their conceptual
model, but we can use their operationalized model to determine what their conceptual
model might look like. The authors’ conceptual cost model can be stated as follows:
Hospital Costs = f (Consolidation, Ownership Structure, Market Input Prices, Market
Factors, Case-Mix, Hospital Size)
Note that case-mix (i.e. the type or mix of patients treated by a hospital) was included in
the other articles we examined under the title “hospital factors.” Case-mix may be
important to our financial performance model, but we believe that this variable can be
included under population characteristics and demographics because population
characteristics will ultimately determine the type of patients treated by a hospital.
Furthermore, as previously discussed, market input prices may be relevant to our model,
but we expect that higher market input prices would increase both costs and prices,
essentially cancelling out the effect on financial performance. Finally, it is important to
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note that hospital size is included within our conceptual model under efficiency because
we hypothesized that hospital size and efficiency were positively related due to economies
of scale.
In operationalizing their conceptual variables, the authors let hospital costs be
measured by real total operating expense. Furthermore, consolidation was operationalized
by two intercept dummy variables: a system acquisition dummy and a merger dummy.
Note that these dummies are the variables of interest in their study. In addition, ownership
structure was operationalized by three dummy variables: a for-profit dummy, a non-secular
non-profit dummy, and a teaching hospital dummy. Market input prices were measured by
the real average hospital wage in the market, hospital size was measured by various
admissions/visits variables, and hospital case-mix was represented by Medicaid share,
Medicare share, and a case-mix index. Finally, market variables included HMO penetration
and market level per capita income. A list of the operationalized variables, their
definitions, and data sources is shown below.
Table 3.6: Corresponds to Table 1 in Dranove and Lindrooth (2003)
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The primary dataset used in Dranove and Lindrooth’s analysis is the American
Hospital Association’s Annual Survey of Hospitals for 1988–2000. However, additional
financial data was included from the Medicare Cost Report and demographic data was
used from the Area Resource File (ARF). In total, there were 244 consolidating hospitals
and 1,220 non-consolidating hospitals in the dataset.
To perform a pre-merger/post-merger study, the authors created the system
acquisition dummy variable and the merger dummy variable and inserted them into the
cost equation. The authors then took the log of all non-dummy variables in their cost
equation and express these variables in difference form (e.g. the dependent variable
was

)). The authors estimated this equation using a 2, 3, and 4-year follow

up period. Specifically, they compared hospital costs 2, 3, and 4 years after consolidation
to hospital costs two years before consolidation in order to directly examine the impact of
consolidation on efficiency.
It is important to note that the authors compared consolidating hospitals to hospitals
that did not consolidate by matching each consolidating pair of hospitals with a sample of
“pseudo-merging” hospitals. That is, they take two hospitals that did not merge and
combine them as if they actually merged in order to compare merging hospitals to
hospitals that could have merged but did not. It is also important to note that the authors
use the “median regression” estimation technique to estimate the cost equation. They use
median regression as opposed to OLS because median regression reduces the sensitivity of
the results to possible outliers, while OLS may be strongly influenced by outliers. The
authors fear outliers may exist due to measurement errors in the Medicare Cost Report.
After running median regressions, the authors found the coefficients for the system
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acquisition dummy to be -0.022, -0.004, and -0.030 for 2, 3, and 4 years after consolidation
respectively (see table 3.7 below). All of these coefficients were statistically insignificant
indicating that consolidation into systems did not generate cost savings, even after 4 years.
Furthermore, the authors found the coefficients for the merger dummy to be -0.141, -0.158,
and -0.141 for 2, 3, and 4 years after consolidation respectively. All three of these
coefficients were statistically significant at the 1% level. Thus, it appears that the median
merger resulted in cost savings of 14.1% two years after the merger, 15.8% three years
after the merger, and 14.1% four years after the merger. The authors also estimated the
model using other techniques such as OLS, but the results were relatively unaffected.
Thus, the authors conclude that system acquisitions did not result in efficiency gains, but
mergers did lead to significant and persistent efficiency improvements. The authors
suggest that one reason for this may be that “hospitals do not merge unless they could
confidently pull it off, while systems consolidations lack such commitment.”
Table 3.7: Corresponds to Table 4 in Dranove and Lindrooth (2003)
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Overall, this article provides strong evidence that local hospital mergers produce
cost-savings. However, we find a few flaws in this study. For example, like Sprang et al.
and Connor et al., Dranove and Lindrooth neglect the impact of quality in their analysis.
This overall neglect of quality leads us to believe that our research (which controls for
quality) can certainly add to the existing literature on hospital consolidation. Furthermore,
we find that the authors could improve their research by determining where the efficiency
gains (cost-savings) are coming from. In other words, their research could benefit by
examining whether efficiency gains were produced by different synergies, reduced
duplication, etc. This could also be beneficial in explaining why system acquisitions
produced much less savings than mergers.
Despite these flaws, we believe that this article is helpful in guiding our research in
a couple ways. First, this article helps us realize that it may be important to separate system
acquisitions and mergers. It seems possible that mergers are more beneficial to society then
system acquisitions, which has implications for our trade-off analysis. In addition, this
article suggests an appropriate time frame for analyzing the effects of consolidation, which
in this case is thought to be 2–4 years after consolidation. Lastly, this article confirms that
the American Hospital Association could be an important potential source of data.

3.4 David Dranove (1998)
In 1998, David Dranove published an article in the Journal of Health Economics
that assesses the magnitude of economies of scale in 14 non-revenue producing cost
centers in hospitals. Dranove notes that economies of scale in non-revenue producing cost
centers – such as central administration, accounting, medical records, and laundry – are
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frequently cited as a justification for mergers and acquisitions. Thus, the goal of article is
to determine whether economies of scale really do exist for these non-revenue producing
centers. If economies of scale do not exist or are limited for these cost centers, then the
benefits of hospital consolidation may be overstated and consolidation may result in net
social losses due to price increases. Dranove points out that there has been little research
concerning the extent of scale economies in hospitals and no research that specifically
examines non-revenue producing cost centers in hospitals. Thus, Dranove argues that a
study that examines economies of scale in these centers is greatly needed.
In the article, Dranove attempts to answer the question “what is the
extent/magnitude of economies of scale in non-revenue producing cost centers in
hospitals?” In other words, does cost center average cost decrease as hospital output
increases and if so, how substantial are these decreases in average cost? This topic is
extremely relevant to our research because we have stated in our theory section that
mergers will lead to efficiency gains through economies of scale. Essentially, we have
stated that the combined entity can spread fixed costs over more output in order to reduce
average cost. For example, we said that this could occur in departments such as
administration, where one hospital eliminates or reduces its department and the combined
entity lowers average costs by spreading the remaining administrative units over more
output. Ultimately, we said that this is one way consolidation could improve hospital
financial performance and be beneficial to society. However, this outcome is dependent on
whether economies of scale actually exist, which creates an important connection between
our research questions and Dranove’s research question. In particular, the research in
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Dranove’s article can provide us with statistical evidence related to the efficiency (costsavings) side of the Williamson Trade-Off Model.
Similar to previous authors, Dranove proposes no formal hypothesis with regards to
the research question stated above. Rather, his research seems to be purely exploratory and
solely concerned with presenting the statistical evidence on economies of scale in nonrevenue producing cost centers (referred to as cost centers from now on). Furthermore,
Dranove does not explicitly present a conceptual model, but we can easily infer what his
conceptual model would be from the operationalized model he uses. We determine that
Dranove’s conceptual model for the total cost of each cost center can be stated as follows:
Total Cost = f (Hospital Output, Input Prices, Case Severity, Ownership Structure, CaseMix)
Dranove eventually divides the dependent variable (total cost) by hospital output because
he is concerned with the relationship between cost center average cost and output. If the
relationship between average cost and output is negative for extended portion of hospital
output, then economies of scale can be said to exist. Note that most of the control variables
in the model appear to be theoretically relevant. In particular, higher market input prices
(e.g. higher wages) should certainly increase total cost for each cost center. Furthermore,
case mix, or the type of patients treated, may influence total cost because it can place
different demands on each cost center. Dranove admits, however, that case severity (i.e. the
difficulty of the cases treated by the hospital) has unknown effect on cost center total cost
and may not be relevant. Lastly, ownership structure is a common variable in all the
articles we have examined, which supports our decision to include this variable in our own
conceptual model.
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To operationalize these conceptual variables, Dranove let cost center total cost be
measured by “adjusted direct cost.” Adjusted direct cost includes all expenses directly
borne by the cost center, such as wages and benefits, purchased services, supplies,
depreciation of department equipment, and leases/rentals.
Hospital output was measured by adjusted discharges, which is computed using the
following equation:
Adjusted Discharges = (# of discharges) ∙ (Total Charges ∕ Total Inpatient Charges)
This equation essentially adjusts discharges for the fact that hospitals both have inpatient
and outpatient services. Note that average cost, in this case, is equal to adjusted direct cost
(total cost) divided by adjusted discharges (output).
In addition, input prices are measured by the area wage index and case-mix is
quantified by the percentage of total charges attributed to Medicare and Medicaid.
Ownership Structure is operationalized by using two dummy variables: For-profit (=1 if
the hospital is for-profit) and Teach (=1 if the hospital is trains medical residents). Lastly,
Dranove measures case severity by estimating each hospital’s average case weight, which
is determined by assigning weights to each admission at each hospital. Note that the log is
taken of all variables with the exception of For-profit, Teach, percent Medicare, and
percent Medicaid.
The only data source for Dranove’s analysis is the California Office of Statewide
Health Planning and Development (OSHPD) financial data set for fiscal year 1992. This
data set contains information on 302 hospitals in California and most importantly, contains
information on the costs for 14 non-revenue producing cost centers in each hospital. The
14 cost centers examined are listed in table 3.8 (page 64).
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Dranove estimates the operationalized total cost function for each cost center using
semiparametric methods. In other words, the total cost function has the following form:
log(Total Cost) = B ∙ (Predictors) + log(f(Discharges))
In this case, B is a vector of coefficients to be estimated parametrically and f(Discharges)
is a general function. This means that total cost will vary parametrically with the control
variables, but non-parametrically with the variable of interest (Adjusted Discharges).
Dranove uses this approach because no functional form needs to be specified for the
cost/output relationship. In other words, the semiparametric approach allows Dranove to
avoid making assumptions about the shape of the cost curves. However, he notes that one
flaw of the semiparametric approach is that it does not permit hypothesis testing for the
nonparametric results. Ultimately, Dranove determines that the total cost function above
can be estimated by first regressing log(Total Cost) on the control variables (i.e. the
parametric part) and then fitting the residuals of this regression to log(f(Discharges))
through the method of kernals. This yields a set of parametric estimates and nonparametric estimates. While we will focus on the non-parametric results, we display both
the parametric results (table 3.8) and nonparametric results (table 3.9) below.
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Table 3.8: Corresponds to Table 2 in Dranove (1998)

Table 3.9: Corresponds to Table 3 in Dranove (1998)

Table 3.9 displays, for each cost center, the relative cost per discharge for hospitals
with 2500, 5000, 7500, 10,000, 15,000, and 20,000 discharges. Notice that Dranove is now
using average cost (cost per discharge) rather than total cost in order to examine economies
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of scale. Also notice that costs at a hospital with 10,000 discharges are normalized to equal
1, which is why we said that the relative cost per discharge is displayed.
Overall, Dranove finds that economies of scale seem to exist in almost all cost
centers since relative cost per discharge decreases for most cost centers as output levels
increase. In particular, it seems that economies of scale are relatively large in cost centers
such as administration, accounting, communications, and “hotel services” (i.e. cafeteria,
laundry, and housekeeping). However, scale economies are relatively small in areas such
as public relations, data processing, printing, and credit and collection. Dranove argues that
the differences in economies of scale across the cost centers are partially due to the ability
of different cost centers to outsource their activities. In other words, cost centers like data
processing, printing, and credit/collection can be easily outsourced to other firms and this
tends to equalize average cost across different sized hospitals. On the other hand, cost
centers like administration, accounting, and communications require internal professional
staff and cannot be outsourced, which allows scale economies to occur in these
departments.
Note that Dranove also aggregates the cost centers and finds that cost per discharge
seems to decrease up until about 7500 discharges, after which the average cost curve
becomes flat. Moving from 2500 to 7500 discharges decreases average costs by 32%,
while moving from 5000 to 7500 discharges decreases average costs by 6%. However,
from 7500 to 20,000 discharges there is little to no movement in average cost. Thus,
Dranove concludes that there are economies of scale up to about 7500 discharges (200
beds), but after this level of output, scale economies are extremely minimal. These results
have important implications for hospital mergers because they show that only smaller
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hospitals may benefit from economies of scale by merging. Specifically, mergers between
hospitals with around 100 beds are likely to generate significant efficiency gains from
economies of scale, but mergers of hospitals with closer to 200 beds are not likely to
generate cost savings in non-revenue producing cost centers.
Overall, this article gives us a great deal of knowledge on the extent of economies
of scale in non-revenue producing cost centers. However, one could argue that the research
presented here would have greatly benefitted from a larger dataset that was not restricted to
hospitals in California. In other words, we would imagine that a nationwide study would
lead to more reliable results due to having a larger number of observations. Furthermore, it
is important to recognize that non-revenue producing cost centers only account for a small
percentage of hospital total costs (about 15% according to Dranove). Thus, we should not
jump to conclusions about economies of scale and efficiency gains for merging hospitals
based solely on this article. In particular, it is very possible that economies of scale can be
exploited in the other areas that generate hospital costs and not just in the 14 cost centers
discussed here.
As previously stated, we find that this article is very relevant to the discussion in
our theory section on economies of scale. Specifically, this article provides statistical
evidence for our theory that there are economies of scale that can be exploited. However,
we must recognize that the extent of these economies of scale may be more limited than we
think. While this article is relevant for our theory section, the relevance to our empirical
work is less evident. Despite this fact, Dranove does give us ways of measuring certain
operationalized variables. For instance, we can use adjusted discharges as a measure of
output if we are interested in quantifying economies of scale or average costs. In addition,

66

this article provides further confirmation that Medicare and Medicaid percentages should
be included in our empirical model (possibly to account for population characteristics and
demographics).

3.5 Teresa D. Harrison (2011)
In 2011, Teresa Harrison published an article in the Economic Inquiry that
compares potential and realized cost savings from hospital mergers. More specifically, her
analysis focuses on potential and realized cost savings due to economies of scale. Harrison
notes that many previous studies have also examined the cost savings from hospital
mergers. However, she argues that previous studies have not examined cost savings in any
real detail. For instance, most previous studies simply report whether mergers produced
cost savings and do not examine where these cost savings might be coming from. Harrison
argues that her research addresses this and adds to the existing literature in a couple ways.
First, her research specifically examines the role played by economies of scale in
producing cost savings, which addresses the question of where cost savings may be
coming from following a merger. Furthermore, her research adds to the existing literature
by examining whether merging hospitals “could have done better.” In other words,
Harrison estimates potential cost savings and compares this to realized cost savings to
determine whether cost savings from economies of scale were fully exploited by merging
hospitals.
In the article, Harrison attempts to answer the question “do economies of scale
exist for merging hospitals and if so, do the merging hospitals capitalize on these potential
cost savings after the merger?” The question could be more generally phrased as “do
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hospital mergers result in cost savings due to economies of scale and could merging
hospitals have done better?” Harrison’s focus on economies of scale is particularly
important to our research because we have proposed that consolidation will lead to
efficiency gains (cost savings) through scale economies. For example, we said in our
theory section that merging hospitals could reduce service duplication and reduce
administrative units in order to spread the remaining fixed costs over more output and
lower long-run average costs. Thus, Harrison’s research should provide us with statistical
evidence that is relevant to our theory on efficiency gains from consolidation. In addition,
Harrison’s emphasis on determining whether merging hospitals “could have done better”
ultimately gives us an idea of whether hospitals are maximizing potential gains in financial
performance after consolidation. In theory, potential improvements in profitability from
consolidation may be quite large, but if hospitals do not capitalize on these potential gains,
then maybe we need to consider why this is the case.
Like the previous authors, Harrison does not propose a formal hypothesis with
regards to the research question stated above. Rather, Harrison simply points out that the
majority of previous studies have found evidence that hospital mergers lead to cost
savings. Furthermore, Harrison does not explicitly present a conceptual model, but we can
look at her operationalized model to determine what her conceptual model might be. We
find that Harrison’s conceptual model can be stated as follows:
Cost = f (Hospital Output, Ownership Structure, Location, Case Severity, Time)
Note that Harrison’s conceptual model is very similar to Dranove’s model (the only new
variables are location and time). The relationship between hospital location (i.e. urban or
rural) and hospital costs is relatively unknown; although it could be a factor that influences
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input prices, which would ultimately mean that it affects costs. Furthermore, Harrison
believes that time is important because as time changes, hospitals face different economic
climates and this will likely influence costs. Case severity is also likely to be important
because as the difficultly of cases treated by the hospital increases, the cases are also likely
to be more costly to treat. In Dranove’s study, case severity was not as important because
he was looking specifically at the costs for non-revenue producing departments. Lastly, the
relationship of interest is between hospital output and cost because merging has the effect
of combining the output of two separate hospitals. Essentially, we want to know if the
relationship between output and cost is such that as output increases, average cost
decreases.
To operationalize the conceptual variables, Harrison first let the dependent variable,
Cost, be equal to real total expenses divided by a wage index. Note that Harrison divides
by a wage index in order to reduce the impact of wage rates on costs. Furthermore, hospital
output is operationalized by admissions and a case-mix index is used as a proxy for case
severity. However, we should note that inpatient days and outpatient visits are also
included in the operationalized model to account for the fact that the inpatient/outpatient
mix will affect costs. In addition, time is measured by year and location is quantified using
the intercept dummy variable, URBAN, which equal to 1 if the hospital is located in an
urban area. Lastly, ownership structure is operationalized using a set of intercept dummy
variables (For-profit, Nonprofit, Government, and Teach). Ultimately, the operationalized
cost function is as follows:
Total Expenses ∕Wage Index = f (Admissions, Inpatient Days, Outpatient Visits, Case-Mix
Index, For-profit, Non-profit, Government, Teaching, Urban, Year)
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The primary source of data for Harrison’s study is the American Hospital
Association’s (AHA) Annual Survey of Hospitals for 1984-1998. In total, there were
78,615 observations from 6,487 hospitals. Of these 6,487 hospitals, 312 were involved in a
merger at some point in the time period covered by the dataset. It is important to note that
this is the third article that has used the AHA’s Annual Survey of Hospitals as the primary
data source.
Harrison uses a nonparametric estimation technique to estimate the operationalized
cost function shown on the previous page. The advantage of using nonparametric
techniques is that they “allow the data to ‘speak for themselves’ in determining the shape
of the regression function without imposing a priori assumptions on the structure of the
data” (Harrison, 2011). In other words, nonparametric techniques allow us to avoid
assuming a particular functional form for the regression equation. Note that this was the
same reason Dranove used semiparametric methods to estimate his cost function.
Essentially, Dranove and Harrison want to avoid making assumptions about the shape of
the cost curves and instead want the data to determine the functional form for them.
In order to determine the cost savings from mergers, Harrison first estimates the
cost function using all 78,615 observations in the dataset. Then, using the estimated cost
function, expected costs are calculated for every hospital involved in a pairwise
consolidation. Essentially, Harrison is evaluating the costs for merging hospitals by
plugging the actual values for the independent variables into the estimated cost equation.
Expected costs are calculated for each merging hospital 3 years prior to merging and then
1, 2, and 3 years after merging. Note that before the merger, the two hospitals report
financial data separately, but after the merger, data is aggregated and reported as if only
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one hospital existed. Thus, to estimate cost savings, the expected costs for 3 years prior to
the merger are summed together for the two hospitals involved in the merger and then
subtracted by the expected costs 1, 2, and 3 years after merger for the combined entity.
However, in order to evaluate potential cost savings from economies of scale, Harrison
assumes that the merging hospitals do not change their output and simply merge facilities.
In other words, she assumes the sum of the outputs three years before merging is the same
output they produce after merging. If economies of scale exist, then the expected potential
costs for the merged entity with this hypothetical output should be lower than the two
hospitals functioning independently. It is important to note that Harrison’s methodology
for estimating potential cost savings is based purely on assumption and Harrison cites no
evidence that this is a reliable way of predicting potential cost savings.
After computing potential cost savings from economies of scale, Harrison
computes expected realized cost savings produced 1, 2, and 3 years after the merger by
simply plugging in the actual output levels provided by the merged hospitals. Table 3.10
below displays the descriptive statistics for expected potential cost savings (
expected realized cost savings (

) and

). These results show that average potential cost savings

from a merger are positive and statically different from zero (at the 5% level). In fact,
potential cost savings from economies of scale for the average hospital are approximately
$1.9 million three years after the merger (mean of

below). Thus, Harrison argues that,

on average, economies of scale can be exploited to reduce costs from their pre-merger
values.
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Table 3.10: Corresponds to Table 4 in Harrison (2011)

We can also compare potential cost savings three years after merger to realized cost
savings 1, 2, and 3 years after merger using table 3.10. Average realized cost savings are
about $3.5 million for one year post-merger, $146,143.20 for two years post-merger, and
$434,046.90 for three years post-merger. Notice that realized cost savings one year after
merger are significantly larger than potential cost savings, but realized cost savings two
and three years following merger are actually less than potential cost savings. In fact, postmerger costs are not statistically lower than pre-merger costs for 2 or 3 years after the
merger. Thus, Harrison finds that hospitals perform better immediately after the merger,
but then the cost savings drastically diminish. Harrison tests whether these results are a
product of output changes or exogenous time stocks. She finds that between 54% and 80%
of the higher costs in later years are due to output choices rather than time trends. Thus,
post-merger costs would have been lower if merging hospitals produced a different output
level in later years. For example, post-merger costs would have been much lower had
merging hospitals produced the combined pre-merger level of output rather than their
actual post-merger level of output.
In summary, Harrison concludes that economies of scale exist for the merging
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hospitals and they take advantage of these cost savings immediately following the merger.
However, the realized gains from economies of scale are reduced in subsequent years after
the merger. Overall, it appears that merging hospitals are realizing cost savings, but they
could have done even better if they had been able to produce a different level of output in
later years.
While this article does produce some interesting results, we find that this study
could have been improved in a couple ways. First, like most of the articles we have
examined, quality has been left out of the empirical model. Harrison admits that this could
lead to biased results if the quality of hospital services is positively correlated with costs
and she argues that future studies may benefit from controlling for quality or even
examining changes in quality from mergers. In other words, we find that the article could
have been improved if quality was accounted for in estimating the cost function. In
addition, we find that Harrison’s analysis would have benefited from the use of more
recent data. This article was published in 2011, but the data being used was from 19841998. Note that most previous articles (Sprang et al., Connor et al., and Dranove and
Lindrooth) examined a similar time period. Thus, it would have been interesting to see the
results for more recent data. Moreover, 1984-1998 was a period of rapid change in the
hospital industry as hospitals shifted from quality competition to price competition due to
increased HMO penetration. Thus, it would be nice to examine the post-shift time period
where we avoid these drastic changes.
Despite these flaws, we find that this article certainly adds to the existing literature
on cost savings from hospital mergers. Furthermore, while we do not plan on using
Harrison’s complicated methodology, it does seem to provide reliable estimates of cost
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savings. To conclude, we find that this article could benefit our own empirical work in a
couple ways. First, the article gives us some ways to operational our conceptual variables.
For example, we may use the case-mix index as a proxy for population characteristics and
admissions if we need to measure output. In addition, like Sprang et al. and Dranove and
Lindrooth, this article suggests that we could use the AHA Annual Survey of Hospitals as
a potential data source. Unfortunately, this source, while reliable, may be expensive
relative to other data sources we can utilize.

3.6 Conclusion to the Literature Chapter
The results of the articles that we have examined show that hospital consolidation
generally results in cost savings (efficiency gains) for consolidating hospitals. In particular,
the results of two of the articles, Dranove (1998) and Harrison (2011), show that cost
savings are available specifically through economies of scale. Furthermore, Sprang et al.
(2009) and Connor et al. (1998) provide evidence that some of the cost savings were
passed on to the consumer in the form of lower prices; although, they determined that this
result depends on the level of competition in the market. Ultimately, the findings of these
articles do shed light on the effect of hospital consolidation on financial performance;
however, they do so indirectly. Thus, we feel we can add the existing literature by directly
measuring the impact of consolidation on hospital financial performance. In addition, we
hope to avoid some of the mistakes of the existing literature, such as the failure to control
for the quality of hospital care. The next section of this study will utilize the articles
examined here to develop an operationalized model of hospital financial performance.
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IV. Model Specification

4.0 Introduction to the Model Specification Section
This section of our study will develop empirical models which will eventually
allow us to attain results that can support or reject our hypotheses. We will break this
section into two parts that detail the steps taken to arrive at our empirical results. The first
part will discuss how we operationalize our conceptual variables and will indicate the
source of data for each operationalized variable. The second part will then discuss our
operational models and how we plan to estimate these models.

4.1 Operationalized Variables and Data Sources
In this section, we operationalize the variables that were included in our conceptual
model and we provide information on the source of data for each operationalized variable.
The process of operationalizing our conceptual variables will be significantly influenced
by the existing literature on hospital consolidation. It will also be significantly influenced
by the suggestions of the top executives at Wooster Community Hospital (Sheron &
Boyes, 2014). As a reminder, our conceptual model is as follows:
HFP = f (Competition, Efficiency, Quality, Ownership Structure, Population Char.)
Ultimately, we will create a consolidation variable in operationalizing this conceptual
model in order to separate hospitals that have consolidated from hospitals that have not
consolidated.
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4.1.1 Operationalizing Hospital Financial Performance
In operationalizing our dependent variable, hospital financial performance, we must
consider the fact that there are a large number of nonprofit hospitals in the hospital
industry. In fact, about 60% of hospitals in the United States are nonprofits (Folland et al.,
2010). The large number of nonprofit hospitals indicates that we must avoid measures of
financial performance that are based on the ability to distribute profits to shareholders. In
other words, we will avoid measures like earnings per share and return on common equity.
While we are unable to use these measures, there are still many other financial
performance indicators that are useful for both nonprofit and for-profit hospitals. For
example, operating margin and total “profit” margin are commonly used indicators of
hospital financial performance. Operating margin is calculated as operating revenue minus
operating expense divided by operating revenue, while total margin is calculated as total
revenue minus total expenses divided by total revenue (see formulas below). Note that the
major difference between these two measures is that only total margin includes any
revenue or expenses acquired/incurred through fundraising, outside investments, and debt
(Dees et al., 2001).

Scott Boyes, CFO at Wooster Community Hospital, suggests that operating margin
and EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization) are the
primary indicators of a hospital’s current financial performance (Sheron & Boyes, 2014).
However, he also recognizes the importance of debt and the condition of a hospital’s
facilities in determining a hospital’s future financial performance. Thus, if examining a
hospital’s overall financial condition, he suggests that we consider debt measures (e.g. debt
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to asset ratios) and plant condition measures (e.g. average age of plant), along with
operational profitability.
In operationalizing our model, we prefer to use operating margin as our measure of
hospital financial performance. One reason we prefer operating margin is because we are
primarily concerned with the effects of consolidation on hospital operations, rather than
any effects of consolidation on non-operational revenues/expenses such as investments. A
second reason we prefer operating margin is because operating margin is likely to be a
more consistent measure of profitability and financial risk since it excludes these nonoperational revenues and expenses that can vary substantially from year to year. Finally,
while we believe that Mr. Boyes’ concern for hospital debt and facility condition is
warranted, we will use operating margin because we would like to focus on current
financial performance rather than long-term financial condition. Note that this choice
allows us to examine the short-term results of consolidation, but it may limit the
consideration of long-term viability issues. Thus, future research that utilizes longer-term
financial performance measures may be valuable in further examining the potential
viability benefits of hospital consolidation. Ultimately, data on the operating margin for
each hospital in our sample will come from the American Hospital Directory (AHD)
website, which the College of Wooster is currently subscribed to (AHD Website, 2014).

4.1.2 Operationalizing Competition
Like Connor et al. (1998) and Sprang et al. (2009), we will use the HerfindahlHirschman Index (HHI) to measure the level of competition facing individual hospitals.
The HHI is the sum of the squared market shares over all firms (hospitals) in the market
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area, where market share is defined as the fraction of the total market output that a firm
produces. In mathematical terms, HHI=

, where N is the number of firms

(hospitals) in the market and MSi is the market share of the ith firm. Higher HHI values
indicate more market concentration and thus, less competition. For example, the highest
value that the HHI can be is 10,000, which indicates a monopoly in the market. Note that
we expect a positive relationship between the HHI and operating margin because theory
indicates that financial performance should increase as competition decreases (i.e. as the
HHI increases).
In calculating the HHI for each hospital’s market area, there are two complications
that arise. First, how do we determine what the market area should be? The existing
literature often bases the market area on metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) or individual
counties (Sprang et al, 2009). However, we will define the market area for an individual
hospital as the 15 mile radius surrounding the hospital in question. In other words, all
hospitals within a 15 mile radius of the hospital in question will be included in the market
area. We believe that this method accurately identifies a hospital’s competitors with
regards to routine or emergency services; however, it may be flawed in identifying
competitors for more difficult procedures since patients are generally willing to travel
farther than 15 miles to have more complicated surgeries performed. While this may be the
case, we believe that our method will adequately identify the market area. The second
complication arises from the fact that hospital output is not clearly defined. We could use
discharges, admissions, or visits, but this information is not always available for every
hospital in the market area. Ultimately, we have decided to use the number of beds at each
hospital as a proxy for output. The number of beds gives us a good indication of the
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relative size of each hospital, which is desirable for calculating the HHI. Note that the
market share for each hospital will be defined as the fraction of the total market number of
beds that are located at the hospital.
The HHI will be put in logarithmic form because we believe that there is a nonlinear relationship between the HHI and financial performance. In particular, we believe
that a 100 point increase in the value of the HHI would increase financial performance
more for hospitals in less concentrated markets compared to hospitals that are already in
highly concentrated markets. Note that Sprang et al. and Connor et al. put the HHI in log
form because they identified a non-linear relationship between the HHI and hospital prices.
Ultimately, the data necessary for calculating the HHI will come from the American
Hospital Directory (AHD) website. This website allows us to easily determine which
hospitals are within a 15 mile radius of the hospital in question. Information on the number
of beds for each hospital in the market area is also readily available through the website.

4.1.3 Operationalizing Efficiency
Alexander et al. (1996) provide us with some common ways to operationalize
hospital efficiency. One way Alexander et al. (1996) measure efficiency is by the
occupancy rate, which is calculated as the ratio of average daily census to the number of
beds. More efficient hospitals are likely to have higher occupancy rates because they are
able to provide more services with a given number of inputs (in this case, beds). Note that
Connor et al. (1998) and Sprang et al. (2009) both included occupancy rate in their models
to measure hospital efficiency.
Alexander et al. also recognized the importance of hospital size or scale of
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operation in determining efficiency. Thus, in order to account for the influence of hospital
size, they decided to include statistical beds and adjusted admissions in their model.
Statistical beds is the average number of beds set up and staffed for use, while adjusted
admissions is the sum of hospital inpatient admissions and equivalent admissions attributed
to outpatient services based on revenue generation (Alexander et al., 1996). Note that most
articles we examined decided to include some kind of admissions variable in their
operational model. Thus, it appears that the existing literature also finds scale of operation
(size) to be theoretically relevant.
In operationalizing efficiency, we believe it is important to consider operating
efficiency (given by the occupancy rate) and efficiency gains generated by scale
economies. Thus, we will operationalize efficiency using hospital occupancy rate and
number of beds. We choose number of beds because it is one of the clearest indicators of
hospital size. In addition, we want to avoid output measures, like admissions and inpatient
days, because we will eventually use output measures in calculating the dependent variable
for our average cost and price models (to be discussed later).
The number of staffed beds will be put in logarithmic form because we believe that
as size increases, the additional cost advantage from greater size decreases. In other words,
we believe there is a non-linear relationship between the number of beds and financial
performance because the cost advantages of greater size eventually run out. Note that we
expect the occupancy rate and the log of beds to have positive coefficients because each
should have a positive relationship with operating margin. Data on the occupancy rate and
the number of beds will come from the AHD website and the American Hospital
Association’s Guide to the Health Care Field (AHA Guide, 2010-2013). The AHD
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website has information on these variables for 2012, while the AHA Guide will supply us
with our data on these variables for 2008 to 2011.

4.1.4 Operationalizing Quality
In reviewing the existing literature, we found that hospital quality was generally
neglected as a control variable. Thus, the existing literature offers us few suggestions on
how to measure quality. However, Folland et al., in their textbook “The Economics of
Health and Health Care,” give us some common, but controversial, ways of
operationalizing hospital quality. One way to measure quality is by hospital mortality rates
and error rates (Folland et al., 2010). In general, we expect that higher quality hospitals
have more prestigious staff that make fewer errors and thus, have fewer patients die.
However, morality rates and error rates depend considerably on the kinds of patients the
hospital is treating and the kinds of diseases they are dealing with. For example, hospitals
specializing in cancer treatment are likely to have high mortality rates not because they are
providing low-quality care, but because the cases they are handling are more difficult and
life-threatening.
Another way to operationalize quality is by readmission rates (Folland et al., 2010).
We expect that higher quality hospitals have lower readmission rates because they get the
diagnosis and treatment/procedure correct the first time and thus, have fewer patients
return with issues. Note that this measure seems to be less subject to the problems involved
with morality and error rates, but readmissions rates may still vary with case-mix.
Bill Sheron, CEO at Wooster Community Hospital, has suggested that we
operationalize quality of care through the results of patient satisfaction surveys (Sheron &

81

Boyes, 2014). These surveys directly ask the patients about the quality of care they
received and their overall rating of the hospital. The patients will likely consider many
aspects of their experience such as effectiveness of the treatment/procedure, the demeanor
of the nurses/doctors, and cleanliness of the facility. Overall, it appears that survey results
may avoid the case-mix problems of the other indicators. However, the survey results may
be based primarily on the behavior of the physicians and nurses towards the patient rather
than on the effectiveness of the treatment or procedure. Thus, we have ultimately chosen to
use the readmission rate as our measure of hospital quality. We believe that the
readmission rate will best represent the effectiveness of the care received by patients and
will be able to avoid most case-mix issues. Note that lower readmission rates indicate a
higher quality of care and thus, we expect a negative relationship between a hospital’s
readmission rate and hospital financial performance (operating margin).
Data on the readmission rate for each hospital will come from the AHD website.
Note that this data is only available for 2012, which will become an issue in attempting to
run regressions with panel data.

4.1.5 Operationalizing Ownership Structure
In each of the five articles that we examined, ownership structure was
operationalized using one or more intercept dummy variables. For example, Sprang et al.,
Connor et al., and Dranove included a for-profit dummy in their models, which was equal
to 1 if the hospital was a for-profit hospital and equal to 0 otherwise. Furthermore,
Dranove and Lindrooth included a for-profit dummy (=1 if for-profit) and a non-profit
dummy (=1 if nonprofit) in their cost model.
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In our operationalized model, we will follow the method used by Sprang et al.,
Connor et al., and Dranove. Thus, “For-profit” will be an intercept dummy variable, which
is equal to 1 if the hospital is a for-profit hospital and equal to 0 if the hospital is a
nonprofit hospital. We will exclude all government-owned hospitals from our data set
because they are likely to be fundamentally different from most hospitals. Note that we
expect “For-profit” to have a positive coefficient because only for-profit hospitals can
issue stock to generate capital. This, in theory, allows for-profit hospitals to more easily
adapt to changing market conditions, which should increase the financial performance of
for-profit hospitals. In collecting data, for-profit or nonprofit status was determined by
through the AHD website.

4.1.6 Operationalizing Population Characteristics and Demographics
“Population characteristics and demographics” is a very broad conceptual variable.
The characteristics of the population served by a hospital are numerous and thus, it is
unreasonable to believe that one operational variable will be sufficient. In fact, the
operationalized models in the existing literature often use three to five variables to account
for the characteristics of the population served by an individual hospital. For instance,
Sprang et al. (2009) and Connor et al. (1998) both included the area unemployment rate in
their empirical model because the unemployment rate is an important indicator of an area’s
economic condition and also the insurance coverage of residents. Higher area
unemployment rates may indicate that an area is struggling economically and it may also
mean that fewer individuals have access to employer-sponsored health insurance.
Ultimately, this means that the unemployment rate will affect the ability of area residents
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to pay for hospital services (i.e. it will affect hospital demand and eventually, financial
performance).
Connor et al. (1998) and Dranove and Lindrooth (2003) both included area per
capita income in their models. Area income is certainly relevant because it is an important
determinant of the demand for hospital services. Ultimately, we will use a similar measure,
“median household income,” to account for area income. Furthermore, four articles that we
examined included measures that account for the percentage of total hospital revenues that
come from Medicare and Medicaid patients. The relative percentage of Medicaid and
Medicare patients is included under the population characteristics and demographics
category because the age of the population determines Medicare percentages and the
number of households near/under the poverty line determines Medicaid percentages. We
said in our theory chapter that a hospital’s percentage of Medicare and Medicaid patients is
important because Medicare and Medicaid payments to hospitals are inadequate (Sheron &
Boyes, 2014). In other words, the greater the percentage of Medicare and Medicaid
patients, the worse off a hospital is likely to be financially, ceteris paribus. Thus, we will
also include “Medicare %” and “Medicaid %” in our operationalized model.
Almost all articles that we examined included “case-mix index” (CMI) in their
models. The CMI of a hospital reflects the diversity, clinical complexity, and the resource
needs of a hospital’s patients. It is determined by assigning weights to different diagnosisrelated groups of patients. Diagnosis-related groups with high resource needs and highly
complex diagnoses are given a higher weight. Thus, a hospital that treats more complex
cases should have a higher CMI. Due to the importance of CMI in the existing literature,
we will also include this variable in our model. Note that this variable may not be related

84

to population characteristics, but we have decided to put it in this category. Also note that
the relationship between CMI and financial performance is uncertain.
Ultimately, the following variables will be included in our empirical model to
operationalize “population characteristics and demographics:” 1) the area unemployment
rate, 2) area median household income, 3) the percentage of hospital revenues that come
from Medicare, 4) the percentage of revenues from Medicaid, and 5) case-mix index. The
inclusion of these variables is based on theory, but also on their importance in the existing
literature. Note that the area unemployment rate and area median household income will be
determined on a county-level basis. That is, we will determine the county in which the
hospital is located and then use that county’s unemployment rate and median household
income for the hospital.
Data on each county’s unemployment rate and median household income will be
taken from the Bureau of Health Professions’ Area Resource File (Area Health Resource
File, 2012). The Area Resource File provided us with data on each county’s average labor
force and average number of unemployed individuals from 2008-2012. We simply had to
divide the number of unemployed individuals by the number of individuals in the labor
force to get a county’s unemployment rate (median household income was directly given
to us for 2008-2012). Data on each hospital’s CMI and percentage of revenue from
Medicare and Medicaid will be taken from the AHD website. However, Medicare and
Medicaid data was only available for 2012, which will become an issue when we run
regressions with panel data.

4.1.7 Sample of Hospitals
Before summarizing this section, it is important to mention that our sample of non85

consolidating hospitals was randomly selected from the AHA Guide, while our sample of
consolidating hospitals was taken from the 2012 Hospital Merger & Acquisition Report
that is published by Irving Levin Associates, Inc (Hospital Acquisition Report, 2012). The
Hospital M&A Report provided us with information on every hospital consolidation that
occurred between January 2009 and June 2012. We included all consolidating hospitals
from this report in our sample except those that were missing data. Ultimately, there were
319 hospitals in our sample, 99 of which consolidated sometime between January 2009
and June 2012.

4.1.8 Summary of Operationalized Variables
The table shown below summarizes section 4.1 by listing each conceptual variable
and its corresponding operationalized variable(s). The relationship between each
operationalized independent variable and our dependent variable (operating margin) is also
displayed in the table along with the data source for each variable.
Table 4.1: Operationalized Variables, Expected Signs, and Data Sources
Conceptual Variable
Operationalized Variable
Expected Sign
Financial Performance
Operating Margin
DV
Competition
Log (HHI)
(+)
Efficiency
Occupancy Rate
(+)
Log (Number of Beds)
(+)
Quality
Readmission Rate
(-)
Ownership Structure
For-Profit (=1 if for-profit)
(+)
Population Char.
Area Unemployment Rate
(-)
Median Household Income
(+)
% Medicare
(-)
% Medicaid
(-)
Case-Mix Index
(?)
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Data Source
AHD
AHD
AHD, AHA
AHD, AHA
AHD
AHD
ARF
ARF
AHD
AHD
AHD

4.2 Operational Models
In developing an operational model, we must be certain that the model we create is
able to address our research questions and corresponding hypotheses in an appropriate and
adequate manner. As a reminder, our research questions are the following: (1) does
hospital consolidation lead to an improvement in the financial performance of
consolidating hospitals; and (2) is a trade-off produced for society as a result of hospital
consolidation? With regards to the first question, we hypothesized that hospital
consolidation leads to an improvement in hospital financial performance due to a decrease
in competition, which allows hospitals to charge higher prices, and due to an increase in
efficiency, which lowers the costs of providing a given level of services for consolidating
hospitals. In regards to the second question, we hypothesized that there is a trade-off for
society and prices will increase enough to dominate any efficiency improvements (creating
a net social loss from consolidation). Ultimately, we must make sure that we are providing
statistical evidence that can support or reject these hypotheses.

4.2.1 The Initial Models
In order to address the financial performance question and also the
competition/efficiency trade-off question, we have decided to use three separate models. 4
The first model will be a financial performance model, where operating margin is the
dependent variable. This model will include all of our operationalized independent
variables and a post-consolidation dummy variable (=1 if consolidated), which will serve
as an indicator of the financial performance of consolidating hospitals relative to nonconsolidating hospitals. The second model will be a price model that also includes all of

87
4. Three models with 3 different dependent variables (financial performance, price, and average cost).

our operationalized independent variables and the post-consolidation dummy variable. The
post-consolidation dummy in the price model will serve as an indicator of the prices
charged by consolidating hospitals relative to hospitals that have not consolidated. The
third model will be an average cost model that includes the same independent variables as
the financial performance and price models. Similar to the financial performance and price
models, the post-consolidation dummy in the average cost model will tell us about average
costs for consolidating hospitals relative to non-consolidating hospitals. Note that this three
model methodology was used by Connor et al. (1998), even though they were primarily
concerned with cost and price issues and not hospital financial performance.
The benefit of adding a price and average cost model is that we can decompose
what is happening to consolidating hospitals in the financial performance model. For
example, if the coefficient on Post-Consolidation is positive in the operating margin
model, then we can observe why this is the case by examining the Post-Consolidation
variable in the price and average cost models. A positive and significant coefficient on
Post-Consolidation in the price model and a negative and significant coefficient on PostConsolidation in the average cost model would reveal that financial performance for
consolidating hospitals is relatively higher because they have both higher prices and lower
average costs compared to non-consolidating hospitals. Ultimately, the price and average
cost models will also allow us to determine whether a trade-off is occurring between
competition and efficiency as a result of consolidation (we will discuss this in detail later
in this section). Note that we will begin our results section by running the three models
using OLS with 2012 cross-sectional data on 319 hospitals. Later in this section, we will
discuss why we run cross-sectional models first and why cross-sectional models are not
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sufficient in answering our research questions.
Prior to discussing other specifications of these three models, it is important to
describe how we will operationalize the price and average cost dependent variables. For
the price model, the dependent variable (price) will be measured by net patient revenue per
adjusted inpatient day. Net patient revenue is calculated as total patient revenue minus
contractual allowances (discounts for insurance companies), while adjusted inpatient days
is calculated as inpatient days multiplied by total patient revenue divided by inpatient
revenue. Note that adjusted inpatient days essentially standardizes hospital output by
converting all outpatient “output” into inpatient days. The formula for adjusted inpatient
days is shown below.

We are required to measure price in this way because hospitals have many different
services and thus, many different prices. Ultimately, this means that we need measures like
net patient revenue per adjusted inpatient day, which give us an average price charged by a
hospital. Note that Sprang et al. (2009) used this same measure to operationalize price;
although other authors have chosen to use adjusted admissions rather than adjusted
inpatient days as a measure hospital output. We find that adjusted inpatient days is a better
measure of hospital output than adjusted admissions because it accounts for the fact that
hospitals can have very different average lengths of stay. Adjusted admissions considers
the number of patients admitted into the hospital, but it does not take into account the fact
that different hospitals will have patients stay for longer or shorter periods of time on
average.
To operationalize average cost, we will use total operating expense per adjusted
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inpatient day. This measure was also used by Sprang et al. as the dependent variable in
their cost model. The data necessary to calculate net patient revenue per adjusted inpatient
day and total operating expense per adjusted inpatient day for 2012 will come from the
AHD website. Ultimately, the three cross-sectional models can be summarized as follows:
Operating Margin = f (Log (HHI), Occupancy Rate, Log (Beds), Readmission Rate, Forprofit, Unemployment Rate, Median Household Income, Medicare %, Medicaid %, Casemix Index, Post-Consolidation)
Net Patient Rev. per Adj. Inpatient Day = f (Log (HHI), Occupancy Rate, Log (Beds),
Readmission Rate, For-profit, Unemployment Rate, Median Household Income, Medicare
%, Medicaid %, Case-mix Index, Post-Consolidation
Operating Exp. per Adj. Inpatient Day = f (Log (HHI), Occupancy Rate, Log (Beds),
Readmission Rate, For-profit, Unemployment Rate, Median Household Income, Medicare
%, Medicaid %, Case-mix Index, Post-Consolidation)

4.2.2 Panel Data and Panel Regressions
While we are initially running our financial performance, price, and average cost
models for 2012 alone, we recognize that this will not truly answer our research questions.
Our research questions are focused on whether hospital consolidation improved
performance, increased prices, and decreased costs. Cross-sectional models will not
directly tell us whether these things occurred. In fact, with cross-sectional models we can
only examine performance, price, and cost for consolidating hospitals relative to nonconsolidating hospitals. That is, with cross-sectional models we cannot indicate how
financial performance, price, and cost have changed as a result of consolidation. For
example, a negative and significant coefficient on Post-Consolidation in the cross-sectional
operating margin model simply means that consolidating hospitals are performing worse
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financially than non-consolidating hospitals. It does not mean that consolidation has
caused consolidating hospitals to perform worse. In fact, it might mean that consolidating
hospitals were doing poorly to begin with, which is why they decided to consolidate in the
first place. Ultimately, we have decided to utilize panel data on the hospitals in our sample
because panel regressions will become the most appropriate way to examine our research
questions and test our hypotheses. It is important to point out that all of the existing
literature on hospital consolidation also uses panel data when attempting to examine the
effects of consolidation.
In addition to recognizing the limitations of cross-sectional models, we also
recognize that a single consolidation dummy variable would not be sufficient in
determining the influence of consolidation on hospital financial performance. Even with
panel data, a single consolidation variable could only allow us to examine the financial
performance of consolidating hospitals relative to non-consolidating hospitals. Thus, to
answer our research questions using panel data, we had to create two consolidation dummy
variables that can distinguish pre-consolidation performance, price, and cost behavior from
post-consolidation performance, price, and cost behavior. 5 As the name implies, “PreConsolidation” will be a dummy variable equal to one in the sample years preceding a
consolidation. For example, if a hospital is involved in a consolidation during 2010, then
“Pre-Consolidation” will be equal to 1 for 2008 and 2009, for that hospital. The second
consolidation dummy, “Post-Consolidation” will be equal to one in the sample years
following a consolidation. Thus, if a hospital is involved in a consolidation in 2010, then
“Post-Consolidation” will be equal to 1 in the sample years 2010, 2011, and 2012, for that
hospital. Hospitals that were not involved in a merger or acquisition from 2008 to 2012
91
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5. Note: we cannot properly use these dummies in the cross-sectional
models because we would not be able to
compare before and after consolidation behavior for the same consolidating hospitals.

will have zero values for both dummy variables for all years. Note that the PreConsolidation coefficient indicates the before-consolidation performance, prices, and
average costs of consolidating hospitals relative to the average hospital. Similarly, the
Post-Consolidation coefficient indicates after-consolidation performance, prices, and
average costs of consolidating hospitals relative to the average hospital.
We should mention that if the consolidation occurred less than six month before the
end of the fiscal year, then we determined that the year of the consolidation should not be
counted as a post-consolidation year. For example, if the fiscal year ends on December 31,
2010 and the hospital consolidated between July 1, 2010 and December 31, 2010, then
2010 would be considered a pre-consolidation year for that hospital. We believe that this
is necessary in order to allow time for the consolidation to influence hospital operations.
Ultimately, we will be interested in comparing the coefficient on the postconsolidation variable to the coefficient on the pre-consolidation variable. If the coefficient
on Post-Consolidation is greater than the coefficient on Pre-Consolidation in the operating
margin model, then we will draw the conclusion that there is statistical evidence that
consolidation is leading to improvements in financial performance. The same type of
analysis will apply for Pre-Consolidation and Post-Consolidation in the price and average
cost models. If the Post-Consolidation coefficient is greater than the Pre-Consolidation
coefficient in the price model, then we have found statistical evidence that consolidation
raised prices (probably by decreasing competition). If the Post-Consolidation coefficient is
less than the Pre-Consolidation coefficient in the average cost model, then we have found
statistical evidence that consolidation decreased average costs and improved efficiency.
This analysis of Pre- and Post-Consolidation in the price and average cost models is what
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will allow us to draw conclusions about the trade-off of consolidation for society. In
particular, if Post is greater than Pre in the price model and Pre is greater than Post in the
average cost model, then we will have evidence that the trade-off illustrated in
Williamson’s Model is taking place.
Note that a change in statistical significance when comparing the two consolidation
dummies would be the most “attractive” result. For instance, if Pre-Consolidation is
negative and significant, but Post-Consolidation is insignificant or even positive and
significant, then we have extremely strong evidence that consolidation is causing an
improvement in financial performance (in the case of the operating margin model). It is
important to point out that this pre-consolidation/post-consolidation methodology for
examining the influence of consolidation was used in the article by Sprang et al. It is also
important to point out that we could interact these consolidation dummies with our
efficiency or competition variables to determine whether efficiency or competition is
having a more significant role following consolidation. However, we prefer to simply
examine the price and average cost models in order to draw conclusions on the potential
efficiency/competition trade-off from hospital consolidation.
In running panel regressions, we must consider whether random effects estimation
or fixed effects estimation should be used for each model. In order to determine whether
random effects or fixed effects should be used, we ran the random effects version of our
performance, price, and average cost models in Stata and did a Breusch-Pagan Test for
random effects for each model. This test presents us with a chi-square statistic and p-value.
For each model, the p-value was 0.000, meaning that we reject the null hypothesis that
random effects should be run and conclude that the fixed effects estimation should be used.

93

However, we encountered a major problem in running fixed effects; namely, the fixed
effects version omitted four of our key variables because they were collinear with the
dummy variable inserted by fixed effects for each hospital. This means that we cannot run
fixed effects and instead will run random effects for all panel models. The only significant
setback of the inability to use fixed effects is that we are unable to control for unobservable
characteristics of individual hospitals that may influence the dependent variable. Fixed
effects estimation is able to do this by inserting an intercept dummy variable for each
hospital minus one into the equation (this changes the intercept for each hospital). Random
effects estimation does not insert these intercept dummy variables, which means that the
coefficients of the independent variables may be biased if there are unobservable
characteristics that influence the dependent variable. Despite this setback, we believe that
random effects estimation will still yield reliable results because we believe that our
operationalized model is specified appropriately.
We encountered a few other important issues when attempting to gather panel data
and run panel regressions. One issue was that we did not have data on three of our
operationalized variables for 2008 to 2011. These three variables were the readmission
rate, the percentage of total revenue attributed to Medicare, and the percentage of total
revenue attributed to Medicaid. This means that three variables that we believe to be
theoretically relevant will have to be left out of our models in running random effects
regressions, which could create the potential for omitted variable bias. Ultimately, this is
the reason why we will first run our performance, price, and average cost models for only
2012. We have data on every operationalized variable for 2012 through the AHD website
and thus, we can run cross-sectional models with 2012 data to see if readmission rate,
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Medicare percentage, and Medicaid percentage are statistically relevant. If these variables
are not statistically relevant, then omitting them in running panel regressions may not be an
issue. As previously stated, running cross-sectional regressions will not answer our
research questions, but it will provide us with information that is valuable in evaluating our
panel regressions.
A second issue that we encountered was that the AHA Guide was missing data for
some of the hospitals in our sample. We used the AHA Guide to collect data on hospital
admissions, beds, and the occupancy rate for 2008 to 2011. However, this information was
missing during multiple years for 14 consolidating hospitals and 5 non-consolidating
hospitals (probably because some hospitals simply did not report any information to the
AHA). Thus, we were forced to exclude these 19 hospitals from the panel data set, which
dropped the total number of hospitals in our sample from 319 to 300 and the total number
of consolidating hospitals from 98 to 84. In addition, a few hospitals in our sample were
missing the occupancy rate and admissions for only one year. However, rather than
eliminating these hospitals completely, we simply took an average of the two closest years
and recorded this in place of the missing data. We only had to do this for eight hospitals so
we do not believe that our results will be affected in any way.
The final issue we encountered involved collecting data on inpatient days in order
to calculate adjusted inpatient days. The AHD website directly gave us inpatient days for
2012; however, for 2008 to 2011, inpatient days were not directly given to us by the AHD
website or the AHA Guide. While we were not given inpatient days, we were given
admissions for 2008 to 2011 by the AHA Guide and we had each hospital’s average length
of stay for 2012 from the AHD website. Thus, in order to determine inpatient days for
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2008 through 2011, we simply multiplied admissions for 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011 by
the 2012 average length of stay for each hospital (since admissions ∙ average length of stay
= inpatient days). Note that we are assuming that the average length of stay is the same
from 2008 to 2012. We do not see this assumption as a major concern because we believe
that length of stay will show very little variability over this 5 year span. However, in our
results section, we will discuss whether our results change if we measure output using
adjusted admissions rather than adjusted inpatient days.

4.2.3 Summary of Operational Model Section
This section of our empirical study has indicated that we will be estimating the
following operational models using random effects:
Operating Margin = f (Log (HHI), Occupancy Rate, Log (Beds), For-profit,
Unemployment Rate, Median Household Income, Case-mix Index, Pre-Consolidation,
Post-Consolidation)
Net Patient Revenue per AID = f (Log (HHI), Occupancy Rate, Log (Beds), For-profit,
Unemployment Rate, Median Household Income, Case-mix Index, Pre-Consolidation,
Post-Consolidation)
Operating Expense per AID = f (Log (HHI), Occupancy Rate, Log (Beds), For-profit,
Unemployment Rate, Median Household Income, Case-mix Index, Pre-Consolidation,
Post-Consolidation)
As previously discussed, readmission rate, Medicare percentage, and Medicaid percentage
are left out of these models because we were unable to gather data on these variables for
2008 through 2011. However, in our results section, we will run the 2012 cross-sectional
models with these variables included in order to determine their statistical relevance. As a
reminder, we are primarily interested in the coefficients on Pre-Consolidation and PostConsolidation for each model.
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V. Empirical Results

5.0 Introduction and Summary Statistics
In the previous section, we operationalized our conceptual variables, developed our
operational models, and established how these models would be estimated. The completion
of these steps means that we are now able to run our empirical models to determine
whether there is statistical evidence that supports our hypotheses. However, before running
regressions, we had Stata display the summary statistics for our 2012 cross-sectional
dataset and our 2008-2012 panel dataset. The summary statistics for both datasets are
displayed below (cross-sectional in table 5.1, panel in table 5.2). Note that the crosssectional dataset contains 319 hospitals, 98 of which consolidated sometime between 2008
and 2012. The panel dataset contains 300 hospitals (84 of which consolidated) and covers a
5-year period, which means that there are a total of 1500 observations.
Table 5.1: Summary statistics for the cross-sectional dataset
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Table 5.2: Summary statistics for the 2008-2012 panel dataset

It is important to point out that Operating Margin, Occupancy Rate, Readmission Rate,
Unemployment Rate, Medicare Percent, and Medicaid Percent are all expressed in
percentage form. It is also important to note that mean operating margins were just above
0%. Thus, on average, the hospitals in our sample are barely breaking even when it comes
to operations.

5.1 Results of the Cross-Sectional Regressions
In the previous section, we indicated that we would initially run the financial
performance, price, and average cost models for 2012 alone. We said that this was an
appropriate starting point of results section because it will allow us to determine the
statistical relevance of the three variables (Readmission Rate, Medicare Percent, and
Medicaid Percent) that we are unable to include in our panel regressions. Thus, we begin
this section by displaying and discussing the results of the three OLS regressions for our
2012 cross-sectional dataset. These results can be seen in table 5.3 below.
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Table 5.3: 2012 Operating Margin, Price, and Average Cost Regression Results (OLS)
(1)
(2)
(3)
Average Cost5
Operating Margin
Price
Log (HHI)
1.777*
79.35
29.79
(2.15)
(1.24)
(0.47)
Occupancy Rate

0.150***
(3.74)

-3.761
(-1.22)

-6.849*
(-2.21)

Log (Beds)

-0.543
(-0.54)

-443.4***
(-5.76)

-442.0***
(-5.72)

Readmission Rate

-1.320*
(-2.33)

12.19
(0.28)

37.85
(0.86)

For-profit

6.900***
(4.89)

-194.6
(-1.78)

-382.5***
(-3.50)

Unemployment Rate

-0.231
(-0.76)

18.00
(0.76)

21.41
(0.91)

Median HH Income

0.0000443
(0.92)

0.0158***
(4.26)

0.0146***
(3.92)

Medicare %

0.00772
(0.11)

0.752
(0.14)

0.801
(0.15)

Medicaid %

-0.132
(-1.79)

10.03
(1.76)

14.50*
(2.54)

CMI

5.525
(1.66)

2569.8***
(9.98)

2465.9***
(9.56)

Post Consolidation

-1.901
(-1.61)

-257.2**
(-2.82)

-213.3*
(-2.33)

Constant

-5.814
(-0.38)

-830.5
(-0.70)

-566.6
(-0.48)

N
Adjusted R2
F-Test P-Value

319
0.175
0.0000

319
0.300
0.0000

319
0.278
0.0000

t statistics in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (two-tail)

It is important to remember that we are primarily concerned with the results of the
operating margin model, even though the price and average cost models provide us with
valuable information in addressing our research questions. Since we are primarily
concerned with the operating margin model, we will discuss the results of this model in
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5. Rather than writing “net patient revenue per adjusted inpatient day” and “operating expense per adjusted inpatient day,”
we will simply refer to the dependent variables as Price and Average Cost.

great detail and only briefly highlight the key results of the price and average cost models.
For the operating margin model, we find that we have some expected and
unexpected results. To start, we find that the coefficient for the log of the HerfindahlHirschman Index has the expected (positive) sign and is significant at the 5% level. The
coefficient of 1.777 on Log (HHI) tells us that a 1% increase in the market area HHI, leads
to a 1.77 percentage point increase in hospital operating margin, ceteris paribus.
Ultimately, this means that we have statistical evidence that competition is inversely
related to financial performance, as we indicated in our theory chapter. Occupancy Rate
also had a coefficient with the expected (positive) sign and was significant at the 0.1%
level. The coefficient of 0.15 on Occupancy Rate indicates that a one percentage point
increase in hospital occupancy rate leads to a 0.15 percentage point increase in operating
margin, ceteris paribus. On the other hand, the coefficient of our size variable, the log of
beds, was actually insignificant, even at the 10% level. Thus, we have evidence that
operating efficiency (as measured by the occupancy rate) is an important factor in
determining financial performance, but hospital size is not.
The results of the operating margin regression also provide evidence that hospital
quality has a significant positive relationship with financial performance. We concluded
this because the coefficient on Readmission Rate had the expected (negative) sign and was
significant at the 1% level. Note that the coefficient of -1.32 on Readmission Rate
indicates that a one percentage point increase in a hospital’s readmission rate leads to a
1.32 percentage point decrease in operating margin, ceteris paribus. In addition, for-profit
hospitals appear to be performing better than non-profit hospitals because our For-profit
dummy had a positive coefficient and was significant at the 0.1% level. Ultimately, our
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results tell us that for-profit hospitals have operating margins that are 6.9 percentage points
higher than non-profit hospitals, ceteris paribus.
We found that Unemployment Rate, Median Household Income, and Medicare
Percent were all insignificant, even at the 10% level. Thus, it appears that three of our
population/demographic variables are not having a significant influence on financial
performance. On the other hand, Medicaid Percent was significant at the 5% level with the
expected (negative) sign and CMI was significant at the 10% level (we ran a two-tail test
for CMI because we did not have an expected sign for this variable). The coefficient on
Medicaid Percent indicates that a one percentage point increase in the percentage of
revenue attributed to Medicaid patients leads to a 0.13 percentage point decrease in
operating margin. Furthermore, a one unit increase in the CMI leads to a 5.525 percentage
point increase in operating margin, ceteris paribus. The fact that Medicaid Percent is
significant, but Medicare Percent is insignificant, is surprising because we expected these
two variables to have a very similar influence on financial performance. However, there
are probably differences in the way each variable affects operating margin due to factors
that we did not consider in our theory chapter.
Interestingly, the coefficient on Post-Consolidation was negative, but insignificant
after we conducted a two-tail t-test. Thus, it appears that consolidating hospitals do not
exhibit operating margins that are statistically different from the operating margins of nonconsolidating hospitals. It is important to remember that this does not tell us anything
about how consolidation changed financial performance. It is simply informing us about
the financial performance of consolidating hospitals relative to non-consolidating
hospitals. As a reminder, we have very little ability to compare our operating margin
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regression results to the results of the existing literature due to the lack of articles that
directly examine hospital financial performance (this will not be the case for the price and
average cost regressions).
Prior to discussing the price and average cost regressions, we should point out that
we have not developed any expected signs for the independent variables in these two
models. Thus, we will be running two-tail tests for each variable in the price and average
cost regressions. Note that we are primarily concerned with the consolidation variables in
these two models and we are relatively unconcerned with the other independent variables.
However, we will briefly discuss which variables were statistically relevant in each model.
In the price model, the coefficients for Log (Beds), Median Household Income, and CMI
were significant at the 0.1% level. The positive and significant coefficient for Median
Household Income is not surprising because higher incomes in the area population likely
mean a higher cost of living and/or higher demand for hospital services; both of which
would lead to higher prices. The positive and significant coefficient of CMI is also not
surprising because hospitals that treat more difficult cases are likely to charge higher
prices.
For-profit and Medicaid Percent were significant at the 10% level; however, the
signs for these two variables were contrary to the findings of Connor et al. in their price
model regressions. Interestingly, the coefficient on Post-Consolidation was negative and
significant at the 1% level, indicating that consolidating hospitals have relatively lower
prices compared to non-consolidating hospitals. Lastly, the coefficient on Log (HHI) was
insignificant, which is contrary to economic theory.
In the average cost model, both Log (Beds) and Occupancy Rate had coefficients
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that were negative and significant. This is in agreement with our theory chapter, which
indicated that average costs would be lower for hospitals that were larger and had higher
operating efficiency. This is also in agreement with the findings of Dranove (1998) and
Harrison (2011), which indicated that there are economies of scale available in the hospital
industry. In addition, Median Household Income and CMI were positive and significant at
the 0.1% level in the average cost model, which is in agreement with economic theory and
the findings of the existing literature. For-profit and Medicaid Percent were also significant
in the cost model; although the reasons for this are uncertain. Finally, the coefficient of
Post-Consolidation was negative and significant at the 5% level, meaning that
consolidating hospitals had relatively lower costs compared to non-consolidating hospitals
for 2012. For the most part, the results of our average cost model closely resemble the cost
model results of Sprang et al. (2009), Connor et al. (1998), and Dranove and Lindrooth
(2003).
Notice that in table 5.3 we have included the p-value of the F-test for each model
and the adjusted R2 values for each model. The F-test allows us to determine whether the
explanatory power of each model, as a whole, is significant. In this case, the overall
explanatory power of each model is significant because the p-value of the F-test is below
0.05 for each model. Adjusted R2, on the other hand, informs us of the proportion of the
total variation in the dependent variable that is explained by the independent variables after
adjusting for degrees of freedom. The adjusted R2 was 0.175 for the operating margin
model, 0.3 for the price model, and 0.278 for the average cost model. Note that we use the
adjusted R2, rather than R2, because it allows us to make comparisons across models that
have an unequal number of independent variables.
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When examining the three models collectively, we find that the readmission rate is
statistically relevant in the operating margin model, but not in the price and cost models.
Furthermore, the percentage of revenues attributed to Medicare is not statistically relevant
in all three models, while the percentage of revenues attributed to Medicaid is statistically
relevant in each model. Thus, it appears that absence of Readmission Rate and Medicaid
Percent in our panel regressions has the potential to negatively affect our results. More
specifically, our panel regressions may be subject to omitted variable bias. While this is
unfortunate, we recognize that panel regressions are the most appropriate way to truly test
our hypotheses. Moreover, we still believe that the results of our panel regressions will be
reliable because our models have been developed based on the existing literature and
economic theory. Overall, the absence of Readmission Rate and Medicaid Percent should
not prevent our panel results from being informative.

5.2 Potential Econometric Problems in the Cross-Sectional Regressions
Prior to running panel regressions, it is important that we test our cross-sectional
models for multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity. Multicollinearity is present when there
is a high correlation between two or more independent variables. This becomes a concern
because it can cause the coefficients of the independent variables to be insignificant or
have unexpected signs. Note that we are suspicious that multicollinearity is affecting our
results because there are theoretically relevant variables with insignificant coefficients in
each model. Thus, we began to test for multicollinearity by first checking the pairwise
correlations between all the independent variables. The pairwise correlations can be seen in
table 5.4 below.
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Table 5.4: Pairwise Correlations (2012 dataset)

We found little evidence of high pairwise correlation because all pairwise correlations
were below 0.7. Note that the pairwise correlation between Log (Beds) and CMI of 0.689
is slightly high, but we do not believe that this is significant evidence of multicollinearity.
Since we found relatively low pairwise correlations, we must now check for high multiple
correlation by calculating the variance inflation factor (VIF) of each independent variable.
The VIFs are displayed in the chart below.
Table 5.5: Variance Inflation Factors (2012 dataset)
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According to A.H. Studenmund, a VIF of 5 or greater is evidence of higher multiple
correlation (Studenmund, 2011). However, none of the VIFs shown above are greater than
3; thus, we believe that there is no evidence of high multiple correlation. Ultimately, as a
result of finding low pairwise correlations and no evidence of high multiple correlation, we
conclude that multicollinearity is not affecting the results of our models.
The second cross-sectional econometric problem, heteroskedasticity, is a violation
of the assumption that the population error term has a constant variance. In order to test for
heteroskedasticity, we ran a Breusch-Pagan Test following the OLS estimation of each
model. The Breusch-Pagan Test yields a chi-square statistic and a p-value for the chisquare statistic. We can reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity if the p-value is less
than 0.05. For the operating margin model, the p-value of the chi-square test was 0.8419,
which means that we cannot reject the null and thus, we can conclude that
heteroskedasticity is not present in the operating margin model. However, in the price and
average cost models, we found heteroskedasticity to be present because the p-value of the
chi-square test was 0.000 for each model. Thus, we decided to correct for
heteroskedasticity in the price and average cost models by running regressions with robust
standard errors.
The results of the two models with and without robust standard errors are showed
in Appendix 2 in order to make comparisons. Note that the coefficients of our independent
variables will not change when we run the model with robust SEs. However, the t-values
do change because we are correcting for the potential underestimation of the standard
errors. After comparing the results of the two models with and without robust standard
errors, we find that our previous conclusions have not changed. All variables that were
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significant without robust standard errors are still significant with robust standard errors.
This concludes our analysis of the potential econometric problems in our cross-sectional
OLS regressions.

5.3 Random Effects Regressions
As previously stated, it is necessary that we gather panel data and run panel
regressions because this is the most appropriate way to test our hypotheses. Essentially, we
would not be able to examine the effects of hospital consolidation on financial
performance, prices, and costs without panel regressions (and without the two
consolidation dummies). Thus, the discussion that follows will present the results of our
random effects regressions and analyze what these results tell us with regards to our
research questions. Note that in the previous section we determined that we must use
random effects estimation instead of fixed effects estimation because fixed effects omits
four of our theoretically relevant variables. Ultimately, we believe that the inability to use
fixed effects estimation should not be a major setback and random effects estimation
should produce results that are reliable and informative.
As a reminder, each of our three random effects regressions will contain two
consolidation dummies: Pre-Consolidation and Post-Consolidation. Pre-Consolidation will
be equal to 1 in sample years prior to consolidation, while Post-Consolidation will be equal
to 1 in sample years following consolidation. It will be these two variables that we are
primarily concerned with in testing our hypotheses. The results of our random effects
regressions for the operating margin, price, and average cost models are displayed in the
table 5.6 below.
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Table 5.6: Operating Margin, Price, and Average Cost Results Using Random Effects
(1)
(2)
(3)
Operating Margin
Price
Average Cost
Log (HHI)
1.805*
57.10
4.205
(2.44)
(1.11)
(0.08)
0.0846***
(3.98)

-3.102**
(-2.99)

-4.419***
(-4.18)

0.280
(0.41)

-20.24
(-0.51)

-54.03
(-1.36)

For-profit

7.445***
(5.49)

-43.69
(-0.45)

-241.6*
(-2.51)

Unemployment Rate

-0.378
(-1.34)

15.09
(0.75)

26.78
(1.34)

Median HH Income

0.0000547
(1.22)

0.0134***
(4.16)

0.0117***
(3.68)

5.163*
(2.47)

1171.0***
(10.46)

1124.0***
(9.90)

Pre-Consolidation

-5.903***
(-4.92)

-168.5*
(-1.99)

-42.69
(-0.51)

Post-Consolidation

-3.136*
(-2.56)

-129.8
(-1.52)

-56.58
(-0.67)

Constant

-27.81**
(-2.76)

-296.1
(-0.43)

416.5
(0.61)

N
Prob > Chi2
R-squared

1500
0.0000
0.1526

1500
0.0000
0.2332

1500
0.0000
0.2289

Occupancy Rate
Log (Beds)

CMI

z statistics in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (two-tail)

5.3.1 Operating Margin Regression Results
Upon viewing the results of the operating margin regression, we find that there are
no major differences between the results of the 2012 OM model and the results of the
random effects OM model. This is good news because it means that the absence of
Readmission Rate, Medicare Percent, and Medicaid Percent must not be causing any
substantial issues in the operating margin regression.
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In the operating margin regression, the coefficient for Log (HHI) was positive and
significant at the 1% level. Thus, we continue to find evidence that supports our theory of a
negative relationship between competition and hospital financial performance. Note that
the coefficient of 1.805 on Log (HHI) tells us that a 1% increase in the market area HHI
leads to a 1.805 percentage point increase in hospital operating margin, ceteris paribus. The
coefficient for Occupancy Rate was positive and significant at the 0.1% level, while the
coefficient for Log (Beds) was insignificant. Thus, we have evidence supporting our theory
of a positive relationship between operating efficiency and hospital financial performance,
but we also have evidence that we were incorrect about the relationship between hospital
size and financial performance. Ultimately, we find that a one percentage point increase in
hospital occupancy rate leads to a 0.085 percentage point increase in operating margin,
ceteris paribus.
We continue to find evidence that for-profit hospitals are performing better than
nonprofit hospitals (as predicted in our theory chapter) because our for-profit dummy had a
coefficient that was positive and significant at the 0.1% level. Note that the coefficient on
For-profit tells us that for-profit hospitals have operating margins that are 7.44 percentage
points higher than nonprofit hospitals, ceteris paribus. In addition, contrary to the results of
the 2012 OM model, we found that Unemployment Rate was significant at the 10% level
in the random effects model. The fact that the coefficient of Unemployment Rate is
negative and significant makes sense since higher county-level unemployment rates may
mean that residents have less ability to pay for hospital services. While Unemployment
Rate became significant, our other population/demographic variable, Median Household
Income, remained insignificant, even at the 10% level. Lastly, after conducting a two-tail
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test, we found that CMI was significant at the 5% level. The coefficient for CMI of 5.163
indicates that a one unit increase in a hospital’s case mix index results in a 5.163
percentage point increase in operating margin, ceteris paribus.
We now come to our two consolidation variables, which will allow us to determine
whether there is statistical evidence that consolidation improves the financial performance
of consolidating hospitals. The coefficient for Pre-Consolidation was negative and
significant at the 0.1% level, while the coefficient for Post-Consolidation was negative and
significant at the 5% level (both two-tail tests). The fact that both consolidation dummies
were negative and significant indicates that consolidating hospitals are performing worse
than non-consolidating hospitals before and after consolidation. However, we have
evidence that consolidation improved financial performance because the coefficient on
Post-Consolidation of -3.136 is greater than the coefficient on Pre-Consolidation of -5.903.
In addition, our conclusion is supported by the fact that Pre-Consolidation was significant
at the 0.1% level, while Post-Consolidation was only significant at the 5% level. Overall, it
seems that consolidating hospitals are performing much worse than non-consolidating
hospitals prior to consolidation, but consolidation is allowing them to move towards the
financial performance standards of non-consolidating hospitals after consolidation.
Note that our results seem to indicate that relatively poor performing hospitals are
the ones that are driven to merge or be acquired. These hospitals are hoping that
consolidation will have desirable effects that keep them viable in the long run. From our
results, it appears that this motivation for consolidating is reasonable and realistic since
consolidation appears to be increasing operating margins. In summary, we have statistical
evidence supporting our hypothesis that consolidation improves hospital financial
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performance.

5.3.2 Price and Average Cost Regression Results
As previously discussed, the results of the price and average cost models become
important to us because they allow us to (1) decompose what is happening in the financial
performance model and (2) examine whether a trade-off is occurring for society as a result
of consolidation. In particular, the consolidation variables in these models will allow us to
adequately address our two research questions. Thus, for the price and average cost
random effects regressions, we will briefly discuss the results for the first 7 explanatory
variables and then discuss the results for the two consolidation variables in much more
detail. It is important to note that we will be conducting two-tail tests for each independent
variable in these two models because we have not determined what the expected signs of
these variables should be.
In the price regression, we found that Log (HHI) was insignificant, which is
contrary to our theory that higher market concentration (i.e. less competition) results in
higher prices. The reason that Log (HHI) is insignificant is uncertain; although, the
existing literature has also not been able to find consistent results on the relationship
between market concentration and hospital prices (Sprang et al., 2009). Interestingly,
Occupancy Rate was significant at the 1% level, but Log (Beds) was insignificant. These
results are contrary to our findings in the 2012 model, which could indicate that the
absence of Readmission Rate, Medicare Percent, and Medicaid Percent is affecting our
results. In addition, while For-profit was significant in the 2012 model, it is insignificant in
the random effects model. However, the fact that For-profit is insignificant in the price
model is not contrary to the findings of the previous literature (Connor et al., 1998).
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Finally, similar to the 2012 model, Unemployment Rate was insignificant, but Median
Household Income and CMI were significant at the 0.1% level. The positive and
significant coefficients on Median Household Income and CMI are expected from theory
and are in agreement with the findings of Connor et al.
When examining the two consolidation variables, we find that the coefficient of 168.54 for Pre-Consolidation is significant at the 5% level, while the coefficient of -129.83
for Post-Consolidation is insignificant. Therefore, we have evidence that consolidation
allows consolidating hospitals to raise prices since the coefficient for Post-Consolidation is
greater than the coefficient for Pre-Consolidation. This conclusion is “enhanced” by the
fact that Pre-Consolidation was significant, but Post-Consolidation was insignificant.
Overall, it appears that consolidating hospitals have pre-consolidation prices that are about
169 dollars lower than the prices of non-consolidating hospitals; however, consolidation
has allowed consolidating hospitals to increase their prices to levels that are insignificantly
different from those of non-consolidating hospitals. In the end, this means we have
evidence supporting our hypothesis that consolidation decreases competition and increases
prices. This also confirms part of the Williamson Trade-Off Theory. Note that Sprang et al.
used the same methodology as us, but found that prices actually decreased following
consolidation. Thus, our results are in direct conflict with some of the findings of the
existing literature.
In the average cost model, we found that Occupancy Rate was negative and
significant at the 0.1% level, which supports our theory that higher operating efficiency
reduces average costs. On the other hand, Log (Beds) was insignificant, which seems to
indicate that economies of scale are not as substantial as we proposed in our theory
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chapter. For-profit hospitals have lower costs then non-profit hospitals, as indicated by the
negative and significant coefficient on our for-profit dummy. Furthermore, Median
Household Income and CMI continue to be positive and significant at the 0.1% level in our
average cost model. Note that the positive and significant coefficients on Median
Household Income and CMI are expected from theory and are in agreement with the
findings of Connor et al. and Dranove and Lindrooth (2003). Log (HHI) and
Unemployment Rate were both insignificant in the cost model, which actually contradicts
the results of Sprang et al. and Connor et al.
When we examine the consolidation dummies in the average cost model, we find
that both Pre-Consolidation and Post-Consolidation have coefficients that are not
statistically different from zero. The coefficient for Pre-Consolidation was -42.69, while
the coefficient for Post-Consolidation was -56.58. Thus, it appears that Post-Consolidation
costs are slightly lower than Pre-Consolidation costs because the coefficient on PostConsolidation was less than the coefficient on Pre-Consolidation. However, the change
from Pre-Consolidation to Post-Consolidation is very small and thus, there is very limited
evidence that consolidation lowered average costs. Furthermore, the fact that there was no
change in significance when examining these variables reduces our ability to say that a
change occurred. Thus, we will conclude that hospital consolidation did not lead to a
statistically significant decrease in average costs for consolidating hospitals. Ultimately,
this means that we do not have enough evidence to support our hypothesis that hospital
consolidation leads to cost-savings through improvements in efficiency. Note that Sprang
et al. found that consolidation decreased average costs when they used the same empirical
methodology as us. Thus, we have results that deviate from the results of Sprang et al.
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At the bottom of table 5.6, we have included the p-value of the chi-square test for
each model and the R-squared values for each model. The p-value of the chi-square test
informs us of the overall explanatory power of our models. If this p-value is less than 0.05,
then the overall explanatory power is significant. In this case, the p-value for each model is
0.0000, which tells us that independent variables, as a whole, are significantly explaining
the variation in the dependent variable. R-squared, on the other hand, informs us of the
proportion of the total variation in the dependent variable that is explained by the
independent variables. The R-squared was 0.153 for the operating margin model, 0.233 for
the price model, and 0.229 for the average cost model. Thus, the independent variables are
explaining 15.3% of the variation in the dependent variable in the operating margin model,
23.3% of the variation in the dependant variable in the price model, and 22.9% of the
variation in the dependent variable in the average cost model.

5.4 Potential Econometric Problems in the Random Effects Regressions
Before summarizing our findings, we must determine whether the results of our
three random effects regressions were affected by any econometric problems. Note that
there are three econometric problems that can affect panel regressions: multicollinearity,
heteroskedasticity, and serial correlation. As previously mentioned, multicollinearity is
present when there is a high correlation between two or more independent variables. We
are suspicious that multicollinearity is affecting our results because some of our theoretical
relevant independent variables were insignificant in each model. Thus, we first examined
the pairwise correlations between all of our independent variables (shown in table 5.7
below).
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Table 5.7: Pairwise Correlations (2008-2012 dataset)

According to Studenmund, a pairwise correlation of 0.8 or higher is significant evidence of
high pairwise correlation (Studenmund, 2011). However, we find that the highest pairwise
correlation we have is 0.695 (between CMI and Log (Beds)) and thus, it does not appear
that we have high pairwise correlation. Since we found low pairwise correlations, we must
now check for high multiple correlation by calculating the variance inflation factor (VIF)
for each independent variable. The VIFs are shown below.
Table 5.8: Variance Inflation Factors (2008-2012 dataset)

Studenmund’s rule is that a VIF of five or greater is evidence of high multiple correlation
(Studenmund, 2011). However, none of the VIFs are higher than 2.37 and thus, it does not
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appear that there is evidence of high multiple correlation. Ultimately, as a result of finding
low pairwise correlations and no evidence of high multiple correlation, we believe that
multicollinearity is not affecting the results of our models.
Heteroskedasticity is the second econometric problem that can affect the results of
panel regressions. Testing for heteroskedasticity in random effects regressions is
complicated by the fact that there is no specific heteroskedasticity test for random effects.
Thus, we must find alternative ways of determining whether heteroskedasticity is present.
Ultimately, we decided to run OLS regressions for each 2008-2012 model and then
conduct a Breusch-Pagan Test in order to indirectly check for heteroskedasticity in the
random effects regressions. The Breusch-Pagan Test yields a chi-statistic and a p-value for
the chi-statistic. If the p-value is less than 0.05, then we can reject the null of
homoskedasticity. For the operating margin, price, and average cost models we found that
the p-value was 0.0000 for the chi-statistic, which indicates that we can reject the null of
homoskedasticity and conclude that heteroskedasticity is present in all three models. We
will eventually correct for heteroskedasticity by running our random effects models with
clustered robust standard errors. Essentially, this will correct for the potential
underestimation of the standard errors in the presence of heteroskedasticity.
The last potential econometric problem in panel regressions is serial correlation.
Serial correlation implies that the value of the error term from one time period depends in
some systematic way on the value of the error term in other time periods (Studenmund,
2011). This becomes a concern because it can cause the standard errors of the coefficients
to be underestimated, which leads to unreliable F-test and t-test results.
We tested for serial correlation in each model by conducting a Wooldridge Test.
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For the Wooldridge Test, the null hypothesis is no serial correlation and we can reject the
null if the p-value of the F-test is less than 0.05. For all three models, the p-value of the Ftest was 0.0001 or less; thus, we can reject the null of no serial correlation and conclude
that serial correlation is present. However, we should point out that we only have five time
series units, which could reduce the reliability of the Wooldridge Test. Despite this fact,
we decided to correct for the potential underestimation of the standard errors by running
our random effects regressions with clustered robust standard errors. Note that running the
models with clustered robust SEs corrects for both the heteroskedasticity problem and the
serial correlation problem. The results of the operating margin, price, and average cost
models with clustered robust SEs are shown in table 5.9 below.
Table 5.9: Operating Margin, Price, and Avg Cost Model Results w/ Clustered Robust SEs
(1)
(2)
(3)
Operating Margin
Price
Average Cost
Log (HHI)
1.805*
57.10
4.205
(2.45)
(0.98)
(0.08)
0.0846***
(3.57)

-3.102*
(-2.19)

-4.419**
(-3.04)

0.280
(0.35)

-20.24
(-0.34)

-54.03
(-0.92)

For-profit

7.445***
(4.46)

-43.69
(-0.46)

-241.6**
(-2.89)

Unemployment Rate

-0.378
(-1.69)

15.09
(0.73)

26.78
(1.28)

Median HH Income

0.0000547
(1.65)

0.0134***
(3.77)

0.0117***
(3.44)

5.163*
(2.48)

1171.0***
(7.48)

1124.0***
(6.68)

Pre-Consolidation

-5.903***
(-4.03)

-168.5*
(-2.05)

-42.69
(-0.53)

Post-Consolidation

-3.136**
(-2.66)

-129.8
(-1.57)

-56.58
(-0.70)

Occupancy Rate
Log (Beds)

CMI
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Constant
N

-27.81**
(-2.92)

-296.1
(-0.39)

416.5
(0.57)

1500

1500

1500

z statistics in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (two-tail)

It is important to point out that the coefficients of the independent variables do not
change when we run our models with clustered robust standard errors. However, the zvalues do change because we are correcting for the potential underestimation of the
standard errors. In the operating margin model, we do not find any drastic changes;
although, Median Household Income is now significant at the 10% level. In addition, PostConsolidation is now significant at the 1% level instead of at the 5% level and
Unemployment Rate is now significant at the 5% level instead of the 10% level. In the
price model and cost models, we find that a few variables are significant at different levels
than before, but otherwise, nothing has changed. Overall, we find no changes that would
disrupt the conclusions that we have drawn in our previous discussion.

5.5 Adjusted Inpatient Days vs. Adjusted Admissions
In the operational model section (4.2), we indicated that adjusted inpatient days
would be the measure of output used for calculating our price and average cost dependent
variables. However, we also mentioned that we had to assume that average length of stay
remained constant over a five year period in order to calculate inpatient days. As a result,
we said that we would run the price and average cost models with adjusted admissions
(AA) as the measure of output in order to make sure the measure of output chosen does not
significantly affect our conclusions. The results of these regressions are displayed in
Appendix 3, along with results of the adjusted inpatient days (AID) regressions in order to
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make comparisons. After comparing the results with AID and AA, we find that there are
some changes (for Occupancy Rate, Log (Beds), and Log (HHI)), but no changes with
regards to the consolidation variables. Pre-Consolidation and Post-Consolidation remain
insignificant in the average cost model, while Post-Consolidation is still greater than PreConsolidation in the price model and less statistically significant. Since our consolidation
variables revealed the same results when AID and AA were used, we find that our main
conclusions are not influenced by the way we choose to measure hospital output.

5.6 Summary of the Empirical Results Section
In this section, we used random effects regressions containing two consolidation
dummy variables to determine whether consolidation improves financial performance,
increases prices, and decreases average costs for consolidating hospitals. Ultimately, our
results provide statistical evidence that consolidation improves the financial performance
of consolidating hospitals and allows consolidating hospitals to increase prices, as we
hypothesized. However, we found no significant evidence that hospital consolidation leads
to cost-savings, which is contrary to our hypotheses. These results indicate that price
increases, rather than cost-savings, are driving the improvement in hospital financial
performance following consolidation.
Our findings also reveal that the competition/efficiency trade-off is not occurring as
a result of consolidation. Essentially, competition appears to be decreasing after
consolidation, but there is little evidence that efficiency gains are being generated.
Ultimately, it seems that a net social loss is occurring from consolidation because
consumer welfare is declining with little to no counteractive social benefits. It is important
to recognize, however, that consolidating hospitals were performing much worse than non119

consolidating hospital before (and after) consolidation. Thus, consolidation could be
beneficial to society if it is allowing struggling hospitals to remain viable in the long run.
In other words, anti-trust officials should consider the viability benefits of hospital
consolidation and compare them to the losses in consumer welfare that result from lower
levels of competition.
Overall, our findings are intriguing, given that they conflict with much of the
existing literature. For example, while we found that consolidation did not change hospital
costs, Sprang et al. (2009), Connor et al. (1998), Harrison (2011), and Dranove and
Lindrooth (2003) all found that the consolidation generated significant cost-savings.
Furthermore, while we found that consolidation raised prices, Sprang et al. and Connor et
al. indicated that, on average, prices did not increase as a result of consolidation. This
divergence from the existing literature may be the result of using a relatively newer data
set or differences in our empirical model. However, it is difficult to determine the exact
reason behind the difference in results and future research may be needed in order to
establish consistent findings.
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VI. Conclusion
The purpose of this study has been to examine and address two increasingly
important questions concerning the effects of hospital consolidation. These questions are
(1) does hospital consolidation lead to an improvement in the financial performance of
consolidating hospitals and (2) is a trade-off produced for society as a result of hospital
consolidation? As a reminder, we hypothesized in our introduction that hospital
consolidation leads to an improvement in hospital financial performance by decreasing
competition, which allows hospitals to charge higher prices, and by increasing efficiency,
which lowers the costs of providing a given level of services for consolidating hospitals.
We also hypothesized that there is a competition/efficiency trade-off for society from
consolidation and the decreased competition effect will dominate in this trade-off (creating
a net social loss).
Our study was divided into four sections that allowed us to fully examine the effect
of hospital consolidation on hospital financial performance, competition, and efficiency.
The theoretical analysis section discussed the Williamson Trade-Off Model, which is the
basis for our hypothesis that hospital consolidation decreases competition and improves
efficiency. This section of our study also developed a conceptual model of hospital
financial performance based on microeconomic theory. The literature section then
examined the existing literature on hospital consolidation in order to determine the strength
of our conceptual model and develop some ideas on how to specify our empirical model.
Next, the model specification section operationalized our conceptual variables and
developed operational models. Finally, the empirical results section discussed our random
effects regression results, which allowed us to test our hypotheses.
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Ultimately, our empirical results supported the hypothesis that hospital
consolidation improves the financial performance of consolidating hospitals. Interestingly,
our results provide evidence that this improvement in financial performance was attributed
to a reduction in competition, but not an improvement in efficiency. We concluded this
because our price and average cost regressions indicated that consolidation increased
hospital prices, but led to no significant change in hospital costs. As a result of finding that
prices increase, but costs do not change, we can conclude that only one part of the
Williamson Trade-Off is occurring. This means that our second hypothesis of a trade-off
between decreased competition and improved efficiency can be rejected. However, we can
say that our hypothesis of net social loss from consolidation is supported because
consolidation decreased consumer welfare by increasing prices.
At this point, it appears that anti-trust officials should be hesitant to allow these
consolidations to occur. In particular, hospital consolidation does not seem to provide any
benefits to society as a whole because there is no evidence of efficiency gains from
consolidation. However, if we consider whether consolidation improves the long-term
viability of consolidating hospitals, then we may find that consolidation has some
beneficial “side-effects.” These side-effects may include fewer hospital closures or
improved hospital quality. If this is the case, then anti-trust officials should take these
benefits in to consideration and weigh them against the negative impacts of decreased
competition. Note that our empirical results indicated that consolidating hospitals were
performing much worse than non-consolidating hospitals before consolidation. Thus, it
could be that consolidation is the only way these hospitals can remain competitive and
viable in the long-run.
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Overall, we believe that our results are reliable and informative in addressing our
research questions. In particular, our study benefited from the use of a very recent dataset,
which is important in analyzing the ever changing hospital industry. However, we
recognize that our results are by no means perfect because we experienced some
complications in gathering data and running panel regressions. For instance, we were
missing data on three of our theoretically relevant variables in running panel regressions
and thus, our results could be influenced by omitted variable bias. Furthermore, we were
unable to run fixed effects regressions, which could be a problem if our dependent
variables are influenced by unobservable hospital specific factors. Ultimately,
complications such as these only reinforce the fact that our results cannot prove anything;
that is, our results can only provide us with statistical evidence on the effects of hospital
consolidation.
It is important to point out that future studies can build upon our work by simply
avoiding the complications that we had in running panel regressions. In general, we believe
that future research on the topic of consolidation is necessary because the hospital industry
is constantly changing and thus, the impact of hospital consolidation may also change in
the future.
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VIII. Appendices
APPENDIX 1:
The Derivation of the Relationship between the Price Markup over Cost and the Price
Elasticity of Demand
This section of the appendix derives the relationship between the price markup over cost and
the price elasticity of demand. To start, we know that total revenue (TR) is equal to price (P)
multiplied by quantity (Q) and marginal revenue (MR) is simply the derivative of this total
revenue function with respect to quantity (see equation (1) and (2)).
(1)
(2)
Furthermore, we know that profit maximizing firms will produce where MC = MR and thus,
we plug in our equation for MR found in (2) and set it equal to MC to get equation (4).
(3)
(4)
We then move P to the left side of the equation and multiply the right side by (P/P) to get
equation (5) below. Next, we divide by P on both sides to get equation (6). Notice that the
right side of equation (6) is simply the inverse of the equation for price elasticity, which is
shown as 1/εp on the right side of equation (7). Lastly, since it is assumed that elasticity will
always be negative, we can multiple by negative one on each side to get equation (8).
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Equation (8) tells us that the markup of price over marginal cost (expressed as a percentage
of price) is equal to the inverse of the price elasticity of demand. Notice that this means price
elasticity is negatively related to the markup a firm can charge above cost. That is, as price
elasticity increases, the right side of equation (8) gets smaller and thus, the price markup on
the left side must also get smaller. Thus, we have mathematically shown a negative
relationship between price elasticity of demand and profitability, as represented by the
markup a firm is able to charge above cost.
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APPENDIX 2:
Price and Average Cost OLS Regressions With and Without Robust SEs
(1)
Price
79.35
(1.24)

(2)
Price w/ Robust
79.35
(1.13)

(3)
Average Cost
29.79
(0.47)

(4)
AC w/ Robust
29.79
(0.44)

-3.761
(-1.22)

-3.761
(-1.18)

-6.849*
(-2.21)

-6.849*
(-2.23)

-443.4***
(-5.76)

-443.4***
(-5.33)

-442.0***
(-5.72)

-442.0***
(-4.93)

Readmission Rate

12.19
(0.28)

12.19
(0.30)

37.85
(0.86)

37.85
(0.92)

For-profit

-194.6
(-1.78)

-194.6
(-1.84)

-382.5***
(-3.50)

-382.5***
(-3.68)

Unemployment Rate

18.00
(0.76)

18.00
(0.69)

21.41
(0.91)

21.41
(0.82)

Median HH Income

0.0158***
(4.26)

0.0158***
(3.90)

0.0146***
(3.92)

0.0146***
(3.66)

Medicare Percent

0.752
(0.14)

0.752
(0.14)

0.801
(0.15)

0.801
(0.14)

Medicaid Percent

10.03
(1.76)

10.03
(1.93)

14.50*
(2.54)

14.50**
(2.68)

CMI

2569.8***
(9.98)

2569.8***
(8.54)

2465.9***
(9.56)

2465.9***
(7.19)

Post-Consolidation

-257.2**
(-2.82)

-257.2**
(-2.97)

-213.3*
(-2.33)

-213.3*
(-2.45)

Constant

-830.5
(-0.70)

-830.5
(-0.69)

-566.6
(-0.48)

-566.6
(-0.46)

319

319

319

319

Log (HHI)
Occupancy Rate
Log (Beds)

N

t statistics in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (two-tail)
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APPENDIX 3:
Price and Average Cost Random Effects Regression with Adjusted Inpatient Days
(AID) and with Adjusted Admissions (AA) as the Measure of Output
(1)
Price w/ AID
57.10
(1.11)

(2)
Price w/ AA
-331.6
(-1.50)

(3)
Avg. Cost w/ AID
4.205
(0.08)

(4)
Avg. Cost w/ AA
-527.0*
(-2.32)

Occupancy Rate

-3.102**
(-2.99)

-2.539
(-0.59)

-4.419***
(-4.18)

-7.628
(-1.72)

Log (Beds)

-20.24
(-0.51)

606.1***
(3.62)

-54.03
(-1.36)

517.7**
(3.02)

For-profit

-43.69
(-0.45)

-118.8
(-0.28)

-241.6*
(-2.51)

-907.5*
(-2.10)

Unemployment Rate

15.09
(0.75)

50.71
(0.58)

26.78
(1.34)

100.4
(1.12)

Median HH Income

0.0134***
(4.16)

0.0316*
(2.28)

0.0117***
(3.68)

0.0251
(1.76)

CMI

1171.0***
(10.46)

6257.8***
(13.28)

1124.0***
(9.90)

6034.3***
(12.51)

Pre-Consolidation

-168.5*
(-1.99)

-797.1*
(-2.18)

-42.69
(-0.51)

-298.7
(-0.79)

Post-Consolidation

-129.8
(-1.52)

-636.3
(-1.73)

-56.58
(-0.67)

-338.0
(-0.89)

Constant

-296.1
(-0.43)

-1355.4
(-0.46)

416.5
(0.61)

1133.9
(0.37)

1500

1500

1500

1500

Log (HHI)

N

z statistics in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (two tail)
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APPENDIX 4: Stata Output for the 2012 Cross Sectional Dataset
Summary Statistics for the 2012 Dataset:

OLS Regression Results
Operating Margin Model Results (OLS) – Corresponds to Table 5.3, Column (1)
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Price Model Results (OLS) – Corresponds to Table 5.3, Column (2)

Average Cost Model Results (OLS) – Corresponds to Table 5.3, Column (3)
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Testing for Multicollinearity
Pairwise Correlations:

Variance Inflation Factors:

Testing for Heteroskedasticity
For the Operating Margin Model:
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For the Price Model:

For the Average Cost Model:

Correcting for Heteroskedasticity in the Price and Average Cost Models
Price Model with Robust Standard Errors – Corresponds to Appendix 2, Column (2)

132

Average Cost Model with Robust SEs – Corresponds to Appendix 2, Column (4)

APPENDIX 5: Stata Output for the 2008-2012 Panel Dataset
Summary Statistics for the Panel Dataset:
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Declare Panel Data:

Random Effects Regressions:
Operating Margin Model with Random Effects - Corresponds to Table 5.6, Column (1)

Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier Test for Random Effects
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Operating Margin Model with Fixed Effects – Note: Omitted Variables

Price Model with Random Effects – Corresponds to Table 5.6, Column (2)
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Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier Test for Random Effects

Price Model with Fixed Effects – Note: Omitted Variables

136

Average Cost Model with Random Effects – Corresponds to Table 5.6, Column (3)

Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier Test for Random Effects

137

Average Cost Model with Fixed Effects – Note: Omitted Variables

Multicollinearity Tests
Pairwise Correlations:

Variance Inflation Factors:
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Testing for Heteroskedasticity (Run OLS and Do A Breusch-Pagan Test)
For the Operating Margin Model:

For the Price Model:

For the Average Cost Model:

Testing for Serial Correlation (Woodridge Test)
For the Operating Margin Model:

139

For the Price Model:

For the Average Cost Model:

Correcting for Heteroskedasticity and Serial Correlation (Clustered SEs)
Operating Margin Model with Clustered SEs – Corresponds to Table 5.9, Column (1)

140

Price Model with Clustered SEs – Correspond to Table 5.9, Column (2)

Average Cost Model with Clustered SEs – Corresponds to Table 5.9, Column (3)
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Price and Average Cost Models Using Adjusted Admissions
Price Model with Adjusted Admissions – Corresponds to Appendix 3, Column (2)

Average Cost Model with Adjusted Admissions – Appendix 3, Column (4)
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